

National Network for the Defense of Human Rights (RNDDH)



Earthquake of January 12, 2010: Ten (10) years of catastrophic management



January 10, 2020

Summary

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Summary

1. On January 12, 2010, an earthquake with devastating consequences struck Haiti. 10 years later, at the time of the reviews, the National Network for the Defense of Human Rights (RNDDH) presents its report which reviews the recorded human and material losses, the interventions of international humanitarian agencies, the many decisions that have been taken by state authorities, the mass expulsions that have been recorded, and the training and results of the CIRH.

2. In the framework of this report, the RNDDH has visited 18 accommodation camps and sites of relocation. These visits allow him to relate the conditions in which live today the thousands of victims who, since 10 years, staying in slums, under tarpaulins, in tents or shelters semi-temporal provided by the humanitarian agencies, patched since and become by the force of things, permanent.

3. The above information has been analyzed by the RNDDH which considers that:

- The various promises of the international community to help in the reconstruction of Haiti have not been kept;
- Candidates for elective positions who have marched in accommodation camps and relocation sites have not, in their election, kept their commitments to the population;
- The CIRH, managed in the most total opacity, gave no results and had to simply disappear;
- The population of accommodation camps and relocation sites has never been a priority for the state authorities. Today it lives in the most complete denial of its fundamental rights, exposed to insecurity and without access to drinking water, education, health care and latrines;
- Despite its claims, the Haitian government has done nothing to strengthen the country's capacity to manage natural disasters. The earthquake of October 6, 2018 that struck the North-West and the Artibonite has exposed the incapacities of the State;
- Everything has been implemented during the last 10 years to drive out the victims of the earthquake and confine them in remote areas of Port-au-Prince;
- The earthquake of January 12, 2010 has been managed in a way catastrophic.

4. Based on these findings, the RNDDH recommends that state authorities:

- Make the census of accommodation camps and relocation sites as well as of families living there;
- Implement social programs to support the victims of the earthquake of January 12, 2010;
- Equipping civil protection cells with a view to training the general population and school pupils on the behaviors to be adopted before, during and after natural disasters, including earthquakes;
- Supervise new construction to require compliance with seismic regulations.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. January 12, 2010 - January 12, 2020: ten (10) years since a magnitude 7.3 earthquake on the Richter scale struck several cities in the departments of the West, Nippes and Southeast.

2. In the aftermath of this catastrophe, the international community made promises to help the victims. And, throughout the past ten (10) years, commitments have been made by state authorities for the realization of the socio-economic rights of the Haitian population in general and of earthquake victims in particular.

3. Today, at the time of the assessments, what is the situation in Haiti?

4. This report provides an analysis of the various decisions that have been made over the past ten (10) years and examines the conditions in which the earthquake victims of January 12, 2010 are still living.

II. METHOD OF CALCULATION

5. For the publication of this report, the National Network for the Defense of Human Rights (RNDDH) visited eighteen (18) accommodation camps and relocation sites from December 27, 2019 to January 8, 2020, located in the Western Department. These are the following camps and sites:

1. Montpellier
2. MODSOL1
3. MODSOL2
4. MODSOL3
5. MODSOL4
6. Cassagne
7. Camp Réfugié
8. Camp Bénédiction
9. Camp Terrain Toto (CTT)
10. Camp Canaan (Bloc Caradeux)
11. Camp Canaan (Bloc Corail Cesselesse)
12. Corail Cesselesse
13. Camp Saint-Louis
14. Village Tabarre Issa de Greffin
15. Camp Jérusalem
16. Village Lumane Casimir
17. Camp Saint Etienne 1
18. Camp Saint Etienne 2

6. The RNDDH also met with the municipal authorities of Croix-des-Bouquets and Léogâne as well as residents of the accommodation camps and relocation sites.

III. BALANCE SHEET OF HUMAN AND MATERIAL LOSSES GENERATED BY THE EARTHQUAKE OF JANUARY 12, 2010

7. On January 12, 2010, in the afternoon, a 7.3 magnitude earthquake on the Richter scale struck Haiti severely, turning the capital and many provincial cities into a massacre. The National Palace, the cathedral of Port-au-Prince and several other symbols of the state collapsed. The High Staff of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) hosted at the Hotel Christopher, was beheaded.

8. On 24 February 2010, the Directorate of Civil Protection (DPC) reported that two hundred and twenty-two thousand five hundred and seventeen (222,517) people had died, without taking into account many other victims who were condemned under the rubble. It also counted three hundred and ninety-nine hundred (310,900) people injured and estimated that three hundred thousand (300,000) were missing.

9. The victim population has massively moved into public squares and other public and private spaces, spontaneously transforming them into shelter camps. More than a million people found themselves overnight on the streets, including at least four hundred and fifty thousand (450,000) children, many of whom were orphans of both parents.

The earthquake of January 12, 2010 caused huge losses:
222,517 people died
300,000 people are missing.

10. In addition, five hundred and ninety-seven thousand eight hundred one (597,801) people went to the provincial cities of which one hundred and sixty thousand (160,000), on the Haitian-Dominican border areas.

11. Several state institutions presented details of human death and material losses:

- The Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training (MENFP) deplored the death of four thousand six hundred and ninety-three (4,693) people from school including five hundred forty-one (541) teachers, two hundred and one (201) Ministry officials and three thousand nine hundred and fifty-one (3,951) students who were still in the student spaces when the earthquake struck the country. One thousand two hundred and sixty-three (1,263) schools were destroyed, of which fifty-six (56) were public and one thousand two hundred and seven (1,207) were non-public.
- The State University of Haiti has lost three hundred and forty (340) people including twenty (20) teachers, twenty (20) administrative staff and three hundred (300) students who were still at their respective faculty level. Of the eleven (11) buildings in the UEH faculties, eight (8) were declared unfit for use. These are the Faculty of Human Sciences (FASCH), the Ecole Normale Supérieure, the Faculty of Law and Economics, the Faculty of Science, the Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy, the Faculty of Agronomy and Veterinary Medicine, the Faculty of Applied Linguistics, the National Institute of Management and Hautes Etudes Internationales (INAGHEI). The Faculty of Ethnology, the Haitian Institute of African Studies and Research c–in front of the Higher Institute of Studies and Research in Social Sciences (IHERA/ISERSS) and the Faculty of Odontology should, for their part, be repaired before their reuse.

The Haitian state was beheaded. Many public buildings have been destroyed or damaged, including schools, universities, prisons, courts, hospitals, etc.

- Many universities and private vocational schools were also affected, with their buildings partially or totally collapsed. These include the National Diplomatic and Consular Academy (ANDC), the Centre for Diplomatic and International Studies (CEDI), the Olivier et Collaborateurs Group (GOC), the Institut des Hautes Études Commerciales et Économiques (IHECE), Quisqueya University (UNIQ), Notre Dame University of Haiti (UNDH), Lumière University, Royal University of Haiti, University of Port-au-Prince (UP), American University of Modern Sciences of Haiti (UNASMOH), the Episcopal University of Haiti (UNEPH), the Caribbean University, the Louis Pasteur Paramedical Institute, the Saint Gerard Technical Centre, etc.
 - At least twenty-four (24) physicians have lost their lives in the workplace. Five (5) of them worked at the Hospital of the State University of Haiti (HUEH). In addition, ten (10) nurses who were still at HUEH were killed. Twenty-three (23) public hospitals were damaged.
 - Seventy-five (75) officers of the National Police of Haiti (PNH) lost their lives including sixty-one (61) administrative officers, eight (8) prison officers and six (6) officers of the National Palace Security Unit (USGPN). Sixty-seven (67) officers were reported missing and two hundred and fifty - three (253) were seriously injured, of which five (5) had to undergo an amputation of one or more of their body parts¹. Forty-two (42) police stations, sub-police stations and administrative offices of the PNH were affected by the earthquake.
 - Five (5) of the seventeen (17) civilian prisons then in office were damaged. These are the prisons of Delmas 33, Port-au-Prince, Carrefour, Damassin/ Côteaux and Jacmel. Thirty-two (32) prisoners died and another five thousand hundred and eighty-six (5.186) escaped, increasing the prison population from eight thousand nine hundred and eighty-four (8.984) to three thousand seven hundred and ninety-eight (3.798) detainees.
- 75 PNH officers, 10 members of the judiciary, 32 detainees died in the earthquake.
- Ten (10) members of the judiciary lost their lives. The Port-au-Prince court of first instance was hit hard by the loss of the then dean, Me Roc CADET, two (2) judges, four (4) bailiffs and one (1) clerk. Four (4) buildings were completely destroyed. These are the Ministry of Justice, the Palace of Justice of Port-au-Prince², of the Peace Court of the South Section of Port-au-Prince and the Peace Court of Gressier.
 - Nine (9) Courts of First Instance, four (4) Public Prosecutor's Offices, fourteen (14) Peace Courts and the Special Labor Court of Port-au-Prince were damaged³. These are: Courts of First Instance of Croix des Bouquets, Petit-Goâve, Cayes, Coteaux, Aquin, Jacmel, Anse à veau, Jérémie, Cap-Haïtien; Parquets of Port-au-Prince, Petit-Goâve, Cayes, Coteaux; Peace Courts of Croix des Bouquets, Croix des Missions, Ganthier, Thomazeau, Miragoâne, Petite Rivière de Nippes, Grande Rivière du Nord, Bonneau, Saut d'eau, Saint Marc, Hatte Cheveau, Savane à Roches, l'Estère, Verrettes.

¹ Speech of the Director General of the National Police of Haiti, delivered at Delmas 33, on the ruins of the former police station of Delmas 33, on February 21, 2010, during an ecumenical ceremony in memory of the police officers victims of the January 12 earthquake 2010.

² Report on the damage caused by the Earthquake of January 12, 2010 on judicial institutions, Justice Section of MINUSTAH, page 1, 17 pages.

³ Idem

- The human rights sector has lost several activists, including Anne Marie CORIOLAN, Myriam MERLET and Magalie MARCELIN.

IV. ASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY AND INTERVENTIONS BY HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES

12. In a spirit of solidarity, the international community, through numerous humanitarian agencies, rushed to Haiti and gave it the help it so badly needed: food, health care, drinking water, tarpaulins, tents, etc.

13. Rescue teams from abroad came and helped many people who were still under the rubble.

14. Due to the scale of the disaster and the exponential number of victims, in the beginning, organizations on the ground had difficulty taking human dignity into account in their various humanitarian interventions: victims were then forced to spend entire days on line, under the sun, waiting for distributions that sometimes persisted or simply did not arrive. Others had to fight to recover the aid helicopter and thrown from the sky.

15. Some time later, copying various foreign models, a United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was set up in Haiti, with the mission of coordinating humanitarian assistance from the usual partner agencies of the United Nations, with a view to achieving more effective results. And since, in addition to the food supply, the urgency of the moment was to clear up sites and neighborhoods totally devastated by the earthquake, labour-intensive programs such as money for work or food for work have been developed. At the same time, other humanitarian organizations have also implemented transitional shelter programs and money transfer programs, in addition to the distribution of food, drugs, water, which were always in order.

560 humanitarian organizations intervened in Haiti in the distribution of water and food kits, the distribution of tents and tarpaulins, the granting of health care, labour-intensive work and management of accommodation camps and relocation sites.

16. Taking into account the various criticisms of humanitarian interventions, much progress has been made and the Spheres and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) rules have gradually been applied by some humanitarian organizations.

17. The virulent shock of the mitigated catastrophe, the then state authorities began to present the earthquake as an opportunity to rebuild the cities of the country that were severely hit including Port-au-Prince and Léogâne. This was also considered as having been destroyed at 80 %.

18. Thus, on March 22, 2010, one hundred and fifty (150) earth tiles were declared of public utility and the disaster-stricken population was invited to go there. And, several national, regional and international conferences have been held, including one, dated March 31, 2010 in New York, at the headquarters of the United Nations (UN) in which more than one hundred and fifty (150) representatives of friendly countries of Haiti and international agencies. This meeting resulted in:

- The promise to grant 9.9 billion dollars to Haiti, over a period of three (3) years,
- The commitment of the meeting participants to take into account state priorities in their various projects,
- The promise to create a structure to manage the promised funds.

19. In the early years of the earthquake, humanitarian agencies have provided extraordinary work in sanitation, garbage collection, installation of latrines, distribution of water, food, tents, prelates, and semi-permanent shelters, the census, the granting of health care, the distribution of hygienic kits and lighting.

20. Haiti was quickly converted into a market of humanitarian organizations. At least five hundred and sixty (560)⁴ were counted. Some of them were already on the ground, while others did not settle there until after the earthquake. Most of them concentrated their interventions in Port-au-Prince and in the other major cities hit by the earthquake. They also took an active part in the planning of the areas which were declared of public utility by the then state authorities and accompanied the population of the relocation sites, inviting it to better organize itself.

V. REVIEW OF DECISIONS TAKEN BY STATE AUTHORITIES

21. In the aftermath of the earthquake and over the past ten (10) years, many decisions were taken by the state authorities. Here are a few:

a) Body collection and burial in mass graves

22. Due to the countless deaths caused by the earthquake and the evidence that the morgues were overwhelmed by the situation, the state authorities decided to dig mass graves and bury the victims. In this sense, the Centre National des Equipments (CNE) was mainly responsible, alongside certain town halls, for collecting the corpses and transporting them to these pits.

23. This strategy allowed authorities to more or less estimate the number of victims who were killed.

b) Declaration of the state of emergency and creation of the CIRH

24. On January 16, 2010, a few days after the earthquake, a state of emergency was declared on the national territory, on the basis of the law of September 9, 2008⁵ relating thereto. The state of emergency was renewed on January 31, 2010 because the state authorities could, on the basis of Article 5 of that Law, declare a state of emergency only for a period of fifteen (15) days renewable once.

25. On 19 April 2010⁶, a new law governing the state of emergency on the national territory was passed by the Haitian Parliament. Known as the “An Act to amend the State of Emergency Act of September 9, 2008”, it consists of seventeen (17) sections divided into eight (8) chapters dealing mainly with:

- Conditions for the establishment of a state of emergency
- Authorities empowered to declare a state of emergency, its form and duration
- The powers of the authorities
- Monitoring of measures taken during a state of emergency.

⁴ The NGO *Republic of Haiti*, 19 November 2012, Le Nouvelliste

<https://lenouvelliste.com/article/110873/la-republique-ong-dhaiti>

⁵ *State of emergency: The RNDDH analyses the law of 9 September 2008 adopted by the Parliament*, September 2008, 4 pages.

⁶ *An Act to amend the State of Emergency Act of 9 September 2008*,

https://www.ifrc.org/docs/IDRL/Haiti/Loi_portant_amendement_de_la_loi_sur_l'Etat_d'Urgence.pdf

26. Article 7, paragraph 17 of this law authorizes the Haitian State to create and organize all ad hoc structures capable of ensuring the effective management of the emergency situation. On the basis of this faculty, it was created in Article 14 of the State of Emergency Law, the Interim Commission for the Reconstruction of Haiti (CIRH).

27. According to Article 15, at the end of its mandate, the CIRH had to pass the reins to the Régie pour le Développement d'Haïti (RDH).

c) Public Utility Declaration of Property to Accommodate Victims

28. With a view to emptying public spaces and relocating the victims, on 22 March 2010, President René PREVAL declared by order eight (8) properties totaling one hundred and fifty (150) earthen tiles. These are the following properties:

- The Angle of the Bretelle River to the National Road number 1, going towards Port-au-Prince, up to Chapigny, at the entrance of Bon Repos
- B: 788 486.84; 2061596.09 and B1: 791360.24; 2063980.60;
- Corail Cesselesse
- Montet
- Lerebours
- Morne Saint Christophe
- Latanier
- Cocombre

29. These spaces were opened to the victim population, invited to settle there. This is how new relocation sites were created.

d) Displacement of population

30. Immediately after the declaration of public utility of the one hundred and fifty (150) earthenware tiles, humanitarian agencies visited the spaces concerned in order to prepare them to receive the victims. Thus the thousand five hundred and three (1,503) camps then enumerated in different parts of the country began to be cleared.

31. While the people who lived in rental homes agreed to visit these sites, the various owners of collapsed houses preferred to stay on their land, under tarpaulins and tents. Similarly, mega-camps that had been created, were not emptied, the population having decided not to move away from the downtown where it was conducting its daily activities before the earthquake.

32. The many families who had taken refuge in the provinces returned and most of them visited relocation sites such as Corail Cesselesse, Canaan in the hope of obtaining a piece of land.

e) Implementation of Project 16/6

33. On September 30, 2011, the day after the inauguration of President Michel Joseph MARTELLY, a project called 16/6⁷ was born. It was implemented by the Haitian State with the collaboration of the United Nations Development Programme (PNUD), the International Labour Organization (OIT), the International Organization for Migration (OIM), and the United Nations Office for Project Support Services (UNOPS). Its objectives included moving people from 16 camps still

⁷ Inforapide - Projet 16-6, 9 janvier 2014

<https://www.ht.undp.org/content/haiti/fr/home/library/inforapide/inforapide-projet-16-6.html>

located in the capital and allowing them to rent a house for one year. Five hundred (500) US dollars worth then twenty thousand (20,000) gourdes had been offered for this purpose, to families.

34. On November 20, 2015, the PNUD submitted an assessment⁸ of project 16/6 according to which two hundred and fifty (250) marked houses to be demolished were rebuilt, four (4) kilometers of roads were rehabilitated, fourteen (14) drinking water infrastructure, five hundred and fifteen (515) street lights were installed, five (5) public spaces were rehabilitated, fifty (50) camps were closed and eleven thousand (11,000) families relocated.

Project 16/6, implemented in the total disrespect of the right to decent housing, has accelerated the slump of Port-au-Prince and its surroundings, by encouraging the construction of slums on the side of mountains or in river beds.

35. However, these results did not last, as the majority of those who received the five hundred (500) dollars were forced either to find another shelter camp or, to rent a piece of land on the mountainside or in river beds, to build a slum.

36. Over the past ten (10) years, several camps have been closed on the basis of the 16/6 pilot project considered by UNDP to have succeeded, despite all the reservations of human rights organizations including the RNDDH.

37. Thus, for example, the Cassagne Monitoring Camp, Léogâne, formerly installed on a space belonging to Ronald CLERIE who had leased it to the Haitian State was demobilized in September 2019. According to the director general of the town hall of Léogâne, one hundred and twenty-eight (128) families had taken refuge there. They received twenty-five thousand (25,000) gourdes for the payment of a year's rent. Some people preferred to rent land in order to install their semi-permanent shelter.

f) **Implementation of the Lumane Casimir Village Project**

38. On May 16, 2013, President Michel Joseph MARTELLY proceeded to the partial inauguration of a relocation site called Village Lumane Casimir. On December 20, 2013, during a inauguration ceremony, keys were given to some people including PNH officers.

39. Today, the Lumane Casimir Village counts about a thousand five hundred (1,500) small houses, formed of bedrooms measuring 3m40 long by 2m30 wide, dining room measuring 3m50 long by 2m 50 wide and toilet measuring 1m40 long by 1m 10 wide. The kitchen is installed in the corridor.

40. Today, the roofs of many of these houses are punctured and the toilet ducts are blocked.

41. The Lumane Casimir Village welcomes a population totally left to itself.

42. An annex of the Croix-des-Bouquets Town Hall was installed there after its inauguration. It has closed its doors since 2015, due to the uprising caused by the demand of the occupants of the village to pay two thousand five hundred (2,500) gourdes per family, without any explanation while at their installation, they had been asked to pay in the appendix of the Directorate General of Taxes (DGI), the sum of fifteen thousand (15.000) gourdes.

⁸ Haïti - Reconstruction : Bilan positif du projet pilote 16/6; Haïti Libre, 21 novembre 2015

<https://www.haitilibre.com/article-15835-haiti-reconstruction-bilan-positif-du-projet-pilote-16-6.html>

43. The site was initially supplied with electricity through the installation of a solar energy transformation system. As the batteries are exhausted and some solar panels have broken down, the site is now in the dark.

44. The village is not supplied with drinking water. And there is no health center. For health questions, residents must go to Croix-des-Bouquets or Bon-Repos.

45. A school serves the student population of the site. This is the National School Lumane Casimir.

46. There is no Community market in the area. Consequently, the occupants of the Village Lumane Casimir get their supplies from the Croix-des-Bouquets market.

47. Public transport is totally disorganized and very expensive: Between fifty (50) and seventy-five (75) gourdes at least, are necessary for a taxi-bike race.

48. Due to the difficult conditions at the Lumane Casimir Village relocation site, some of the Lumane Casimir Village's small houses were sold by their beneficiaries for amounts ranging from two hundred and fifty thousand (250,000) and five hundred thousand (500,000) gourds. Others were rented at the rate of thirty-five thousand (35,000) gourdes per year.

g) Redevelopment of certain areas of Port-au-Prince

49. Having decided to rebuild a new city center as well as the buildings of the public institutions which were damaged during the earthquake, President René PREVAL on September 2, 2010, issued another decree declaring public utility, the area bounded to the north by Rue des Césars, to the South by Rue St Honoré, to the East by Rue Capois and to the West by the sea shore.

50. On May 25, 2012, President Michel Joseph MARTELLY repealed the decree of September 2, 2010 and restricted the reconstruction area of public buildings affected by the earthquake. In addition, he split the space deemed too wide which had been delimited by René PREVAL.

In downtown Port-au-Prince, 439 houses were demolished and only 150 owners were compensated. Notary Jean Henry CEANT, then involved in the process, presented his victims' check with their fees. Armed individuals instilled such terror that the owners themselves abandoned their homes.

51. On April 6, 2013, the MARTELLY / LAMOTHE government began to demolish the houses located in the new space.

52. On Wednesday June 25, 2014, the Standing Committee on Amicable Acquisition (CPA) created by the law of September 5, 1979, was reactivated. In this sense, the then Secretary of State for Finance, Ronald Décembre opened an office to receive the grievances of the expropriated of Port-au-Prince.

53. Notary Jean Henry CEANT was involved in facilitating the process of acquisition of land by the State and in compensating the victims.

54. At the same time, given the reluctance of some owners to abandon their buildings and the fact that many of them were still waiting to be compensated by the Haitian State, In 2013, state authorities hired individuals to effect the forced eviction of these owners. These individuals equipped with axes, bulldozers, and chisels, invaded the targeted areas and created a climate of terror such that the owners subsequently, themselves left the coveted space.

55. In July 2014, four hundred and thirty-nine (439) houses were demolished. In September 2014, according to notary Jean Henry CEANT, only one hundred and fifty (150) expropriated persons were compensated. Therefore, at least two hundred and eighty-nine (289) owners were not compensated when the authorities had already demolished certain buildings located in the area concerned.

56. This file was so badly handled by the state authorities that notary Jean Henry CEANT, on November 13, 2014, reimbursed Öganizasyon Viktim Kay Kraze (OVKK) the costs of his fees, which at that time amounted to one million nine hundred and sixty-three thousand eight hundred and ninety-one gourdes and twenty-nine cents (1, 963,891.29).

VI. ASSESSMENT OF THE MASS EXPULSIONS OF PEOPLE LIVING IN THE CAMPS

57. A few months after the earthquake, cases of forced evictions were already recorded in some camps. These were mainly landowners who, seeing the emergency phase continue, had decided to expel the occupants from their land, for fear of not being able to do so later. Many of them have resorted to individuals who have not hesitated to create a climate of fear in these camps either by attacking the population in the evening, shooting towards the camps, stones and shards of bottles, burning some tents, etc.

58. This information was confirmed by a report⁹ of the Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster, published in September 2011, supplemented by the research of the Refugee Support and Repatriation Group (GARR) and the RNDDH. They demonstrated that at least one hundred and nine (109) camps were forcibly emptied and twelve (12) others were partially emptied.

58,508 people who were in camps were forcibly expelled. During these operations, acts of violence and human rights violations were recorded.

59. Also in 2011, Wilson JEUDY mayor of Delmas and Jean Yves JASON mayor of Port-au-Prince, were actively involved in these forced evictions where families lost all their business. It was by force that the Carrefour de l'Aéroport, the Stade Sylvio Cator, Place Jean Pierre Boyer, Place Saint Pierre, etc. were emptied of their population.

60. A total of fifty-eight thousand five hundred and eight (58,508) people have been affected by these expulsions, marred by cases of violence and human rights violations.

61. Forced eviction operations continued in 2013, where at least fifteen (15) cases of characterized violence were identified by the RNDDH, the OIM and the GARR in thirteen (13) different mega-camps. They are Camp Place Sainte Anne, Village Gaston Margron, Camp Acra 1, Camp Acra 2, Camp Saint Christophe, Camps Delmas 33, Camp Bristou in Pétion-ville, Camp Trazeli Gérald Bataille, Camp Neptune, Village Lamentin, Camp CAMEP de Delmas 24, Camp Boliman Brant de Delmas 2, Camp Cabaret.

62. The most memorable cases of expulsion were recorded in the mega-camps Acra 1 and Acra 2 which - on the eve of the Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM) summit to be held in Haiti on 18 and 19 February 2013 - were burned and their occupants forced to take refuge elsewhere.

⁹ Report on cases of eviction of the internally displaced population living in camps in Haiti, Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCGC) / Cluster Abri, September 2011, 14 pages.

VII. ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERIM COMMISSION FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF HAITI (CIRH)

63. The CIRH was created to:

- implement the development plan for Haiti on education, transitional housing, permanent housing, agriculture, etc.,
- give its approval to proposals for projects evaluated according to their compliance with the development plan for Haiti;
- develop and solicit projects consistent with the development plan priorities for Haiti;
- decide on the admissibility of external bids.

64. It was composed of twenty-nine (29) members, thirteen (13) of whom were foreigners.

65. In the course of its existence, the CIRH has approved projects totaling US\$200,272,000 (US\$206,272,000) in total.

66. Seven (7) areas of intervention have been identified by the CIRH. They are:

- Of capacity building
- Of Education
- Of Energy
- Housing and shelter
- Seismic Prevention for the North
- Of Job Creation
- About Water and Sanitation

67. Projects included agricultural financing, local risk and disaster management, debris removal, vegetation restoration, management of transboundary natural resources, development of milk production, etc.

68. Departments and other government agencies that were responsible for the implementation of these projects, along with the executing firms, include:

- The Ministry of the Environment;
- The Ministry of Public Health and Population;
- The Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development;
- The Ministry of Public Works Transport and Communication;
- The Ministry of Economy and Finance;
- The Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training;
- The Ministry of Interior and Local Authorities;
- The Office of Monetization of Development Assistance Programs (BMPAD)

69. At least fifteen (15) executing firms have been identified. These include:

- United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
- United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
- United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)
- International Migration Organization (IOM)
- United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
- United Nations Office for Project Support Services (UNOPS)
- Catholic Relief Services (CRS)

- Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communication (MTPTC)
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
- World Bank;
- Ministry of the Environment
- Haitian Development Finance Corporation (SOFHIDES)
- Société Générale Haïtienne de Banque (SOGEBANK)
- Ministry for the Status of Women and Women's Rights (MCFDF)
- National Directorate of Drinking Water and Sanitation (DINEPA)

Projects that were to be implemented by 15 implementing firms were approved by the CIRH. These beneficiary firms are for the most part large international agencies.

70. Meetings of the CIRH, as costly as they were stormy, rarely gave rise to concerted decisions, because of the cumbersome structure whose functioning was totally opaque.

71. After its work, the CIRH had to pass the torch to a national entity, composed exclusively of national actors. However, it had to simply disappear.

VIII. REPORT ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC BUILDINGS

72. Several public buildings were to be rebuilt. These include the following buildings:

- Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Communities
- Ministry of Trade and Industry
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Palace of Finances
- Legislative Palace
- Court of Cassation
- Reception Villa

Constructions have been carried out. Others have not yet been completed. Some others cannot be traced.

IX. ASSESSMENT OF LIVING CONDITIONS IN ACCOMMODATION CAMPS AND RELOCATION SITES

73. On January 12, 2019, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) identified¹⁰ 10 twenty-three (23) accommodation camps of which eighteen (18), representing 78% of the surveyed sites, were visited by the RNDDH as part of this report.

a) Management of accommodation camps and relocation sites

74. In the first few years following the earthquake, accommodation camps and relocation sites were managed by committees. The latter facilitated the work of humanitarian agencies in distributing assistance to victims and assisted in administering accommodation camps and relocation sites.

75. Today, some have retained this practice, others have not. For example, of the eighteen (18) spaces visited by the RNDDH, seven (7) still have committees that work normally. They are Tabarre Issa, Camps Réfugiés, Bénédiction, CTC, Canaan (bloc Caradeux) and Saint-Louis de Gonzague. At least

¹⁰ DTM Haiti I Round 33; population affected by the earthquake, 12 January 2019, <https://dtm.iom.int/haiti>

one (1) camp believes the committee exists but is dysfunctional. This is Camp Saint Etienne 1. The other camps no longer have a committee. However, those who were part of the old structures still enjoy a certain respectability among the inhabitants of these spaces.

b) Population in the camps

76. According to the last census of the IOM, eight thousand five hundred and forty-six (8,546) families representing thirty-four thousand five hundred and eight (34,508) people still live in twenty-three (23) camps.

77. For several reasons, the RNDDH considers that this information does not reflect reality.

- On January 6, 2020, the RNDDH met with the Director General of the Town Hall of Léogane who told him that the Modsol camps were closed and the displaced people living there were relocated. However, the RNDDH was able to go to Camps Modsol 1, 2, 3 and 4. The people met on the spot never heard of any possible relocation planning.
- In several of the camps in Léogane, some of the people we met said they had previously benefited from one of the various relocation programs. However, the amount given to them only covers the rental for a period of one year, when it expired, they returned to live in camps.
- The president of the camp Refugee met RNDDH on January 6, 2020 stated that the last census carried out at the Camp Refugee, Camp Benediction, Camp Terrain Toto (CTT), Camp Canaan (Bloc Carradeux), Camp Saint-Louis, took place in 2018. Twenty-three thousand (23,000) shelters were then counted. For the Refugee Camp alone, three (3000) shelters accommodating one thousand two hundred (1,200) families were counted. For Camp Canaan (Caradeux Block), one thousand one hundred and fifty-three (1,153) families living in three thousand (3,100) shelters were counted. In April 2010, at the time of its inauguration, Camp Saint-Louis welcomed eight hundred and two (802) shelters installed for the families who were in the space of the Institution Saint-Louis de Gonzague in the aftermath of the earthquake. Since then, no census has been conducted by the committee to identify the number of families living there. They have increased.
- Camp Saint Etienne 1, had at the time of its inauguration, ninety (90) shelters built by IOM. Since then, a few occupants have erected blocks of houses.
- Camp Saint Etienne 2, had one hundred and thirty-seven (137) shelters in 2017. However, the management committee estimates that this number has increased since then.
- The Village Tabarre Issa was built with five hundred and fifty-four (554) families. At the end of 2019, nine thousand five hundred (9,500) people were counted, or about one thousand nine hundred (1,900) families.

According to the statements of those in charge of the camp committees that we met, the number of families recorded in the accommodation camps and relocation sites is lower than the reality.

c) Police Presence and Security Situation in the Camps

78. In general, the security situation at the camp level is of great concern. A few police antennas have been installed near some accommodation camps or relocation sites. For example, at Camp Saint Louis, at Corail Cesselesse and on the national road # 1 Canaan area, three (3) antennas were installed to intervene in the areas concerned or in their surroundings. However, these antennas, under-equipped, cannot provide effective assistance to the population during the commission of wrongdoing.

Antenna PNH Saint Louis de Gonzague

79. Some occupants rely on providence not to be victims of acts that harm their lives and physical integrity. Others organize and form surveillance brigades. However, this does not prevent wrongdoing. For example:

- At Camp Saint-Louis, armed individuals circulate freely with firearms.
- In Corail Cesselesse, armed individuals posted themselves at the public transit station, in order to impose their law.
- At Camp Saint Etienne 1, heavy shots are often heard.
- Faced with the growing insecurity of the Tabarre Issa Village, the committee closed the space. This did not stop individuals armed with galil who, as of November 12, 2019, broke into the camp and opened fire on three (3) houses, shooting two (2) people, including the committee chair.
- In Canaan 2, armed attacks are often recorded during which, individuals enter said camp, shoot at the height of men before leaving without worrying.

d) Access to education and health care

80. In the eighteen (18) spaces visited by the RNDDH, eleven (11) have at least one school. These are Camp Benediction, Camp Toto, Saint Etienne 1 and Saint Etienne 2, Tabarre Issa, Canaan 1, Canaan 2 and Canaan 3, Village Lumane Casimir and Corail Cesselesse, Jerusalem. However, the majority are private institutions. In fact, except for rare sites, such as Lumane Casimir Village and Corail Cesselesse have public establishments. Many of these schools have not yet opened their doors for the academic year 2019-2020. These institutions cannot meet the demand.

81. No camp has a vocational school.

82. Health care is inaccessible to people living in accommodation camps and relocation sites. Some of them have a private health centre or are located not far from the city where there were already health centers and hospitals. For example, in Refugee Camp there is a private health centre. Not far from Canaan is a hospital called Hôpital de la Communauté Haïtienne de Bon Repos which serves this population.

The population of accommodation camps and relocation sites live in sub-human conditions without access to health care, drinking water, latrines.

e) Access to public transport

83. Few camps are located near arteries where public transit vehicles are used. This is the case of Village Tabarre Issa de Greffin, Camps Canaan 2, Saint Etienne 1 and Saint Etienne 2. In the majority of cases, the accommodation sites are not accessible, due to the absence or disruption of public transit. For example, a person residing in Camp Benediction must walk for at least thirty-five (35) minutes to the Caradeux van station.

84. Because of this situation, people living there are forced to turn to the only possible option: the motorcycle taxi, which is excessively expensive and inaccessible to those who have no income-generating activity.

f) Access to drinking water

85. A few sites are fed by DINEPA. This is the case for Saint Louis de Gonzague camp and Tabarre Issa de Greffin village. However, the distribution of water is irregular and varies between three and fifteen (15) days, which leads the occupants to fight during distributions. In Corail Cesselesse, however, for more than three (3) years, the occupants have not received water from DINEPA.

86. Occupants of camps and relocation sites Canaan, Saint Etienne 1 and Saint Etienne 2 buy water from trucks. Others have turned it into a business: obtain water by truck and resell it at the rate of five (5) to ten (10) bottles per five (5) gallon bucket. This water is purchased exclusively for everyday use because it is not potable. A gallon of 3.78 liters of purified water sells between five (5) and six (6) bottles.

87. In Léogane, four (4) then artesian serve the occupants of MODSOL camps 1 to 4. Saint Etienne camps 1 and 2, have two (2) pumps which, if they fail, are repaired by the occupants-those who contribute to this end.

g) Distribution of city power

88. Some camp and relocation site occupants have access to city power. Others do not. For example, the camps Réfugiés, Bénédiction, CTC, Canaan (bloc Caradeux) and Saint-Louis de Gonzague are supplied with city power. They have received processors from certain political figures. In other camps, such as Village Tabarre Issa de Greffin, Camps Canaan 2, Saint Etienne 1 and Saint Etienne 2, Corail Cesselesse, the inhabitants themselves contributed to obtain a common transformer. They claim to have given between three thousand five hundred (3,500) and four thousand two hundred and fifty (4,250) gourdes as participation fees, to buy their right to connect to the transformer in question.

89. Alternatives to the current city are also studied in some sites. For example, Tabarre Issa is powered by 3 transformers. The village also has a forty (40) kilowatt generator, which serves the population

90. In camps Saint Etienne 1 and 2, the inhabitants obtained illegal catches, the steps taken with the Haitian electricity authorities having remained unanswered.

h) Access to latrines

91. In rare camps and relocation sites, occupants have access to latrines. This is the case for those who live in Tabarre Issa where the toilets have been incorporated into the buildings. In some other camps, the common latrines, still used by the occupants, are dilapidated, unhealthy and almost full. This is the case of Saint Stephen 2 camp, certain blocks of Corail Cesselesse camp, etc.

92. Apart from these examples, the camps are devoid of latrines. The occupants manage to relieve themselves. For example:

- The camps Montpellier, MODSOL1, MODSOL2, MODSOL3, MODSOL4 and Camp Saint Etienne 1, have no toilet; Site occupants use plastic bags or other containers of all kinds and swing them in spaces generally contiguous to the sites.

- A juxtaposed ravine, nicknamed VAR, is used as a garbage dump and as an open latrine by the occupants of the camps Réfugié, Bénédiction, Terrain Toto, Canaan (Bloc Caradeux) and Camp Saint-Louis.

- In Canaan, the old community latrines are dysfunctional. The occupants use plastic bags or defecate from the ground, thus constituting open-pit latrines located not far from the site.

i) Shelter Condition and Hard House Construction

93. In a new amalgam, houses in concrete, buildings with several floors, slums in metal, etc. shelters built of heteroclite objects, stand side by side in the camps.

94. The semi-temporal shelters which have been provided by humanitarian organizations, which have become permanent by force, are in a state of total disrepair. In some camps, the roofs of these shelters have been patched or covered with tarps, pieces of cardboard, sheet metal, etc.

95. Having understood that the State did not intend to help them, some occupiers decided to build on their own. Some have sought and obtained permission from their home city hall to do so. Others, such as Tabarre Issa or Camp Saint Etienne 2, have gone through the site committee, involved in all the construction processes. Some houses are also numbered in the camps by the town halls concerned.

X. ASSESSMENT OF ACTIONS TO STRENGTHEN THE COUNTRY'S CAPACITY

a) On the promises of training and public awareness

96. In the years following the earthquake, some civil society organizations have implemented training programs on behaviors to be adopted beforehand, during and after natural disasters with an emphasis on earthquakes. The Directorate of Civil Protection (DPC) has also sporadically organized reflection sessions and awareness activities on natural disasters.

97. The state promises to train the population in general and students in particular on earthquakes and to conduct simulation sessions on the behaviors they must adopt, have not been kept. So the population is not formed.

b) Promises of state control and construction supervision

98. Construction is not supervised. Building owners are left to themselves. The only contacts made with them by the state authorities are to charge the construction authorization fee.

99. There is no awareness campaign on seismic constructions. Similarly, there is no structure for supervising buildings.

100. Thus, houses that were to be demolished were repaired, new constructions were made on the mountainside, in the river beds, wherever people can find a piece of land.

c) Case in point: earthquake management on 6 October 2018

101. In a speech delivered on September 25, 2018 at the Concordia Annual Summit in New York, President Jovenel Moïse declared that Haiti, having made significant progress in the preparation and prevention of natural disasters, is more resilient and able to cope with natural disasters.

102. A few days later, on October 6, 2018, an earthquake of magnitude 5.9 on the Richter scale struck a few municipalities in the North-West and Artibonite departments. The centre of the earthquake was located 10 kilometers deep at sea and the epicenter, 19 kilometers northwest of Port-de-Paix. At least twelve (12) people lost their lives, including seven (7) in the Department of the Northwest and five (5) in the Department of the Artibonite.

103. Two thousand and thirty-two (2.032) injured were listed, of which one thousand six hundred and sixty (1.660) in the department of Artibonite and three hundred and seventy-two (372) in the department of the Northwest.

104. One thousand two hundred and twenty-seven (1,227) houses were damaged. Five hundred and ten (510) were recorded in the department of Artibonite. One of them caught fire. Seven hundred and seventeen (717) other houses were damaged in the Northwest Department.

105. The CEANT/MOÏSE government quickly declared that it could build on the lessons learned during the earthquake of 12 January 2010, and announced, with great publicity, have the capacity to coordinate humanitarian aid in order to better manage it.

106. The RNDDH, which had monitored the management of this earthquake, noted that:

- State authorities have been unable to organize the provision of health care to victims and to follow up on urgent cases. The Immaculate Conception Hospital of Port-de-Paix was overwhelmed by the situation. The victims recorded at Gros-Morne were mostly transferred to Gonaïves. They had difficulty receiving the care they deserved;
- State authorities were unable to deliver humanitarian aid from the capital to the affected municipalities. It came late and inadequate despite the many promises that were made. In the end, some victims, who were very rare, had hardly received a few pots of rice, peas and a few cans of oil. For example, on 29 and 30 of October 2018, at the 6th section in the locality Cayo, commune of Port-de-Paix, the Directorate of Civil Protection (DPC) had proceeded to the distribution of some food kits during which one hundred and forty (140) people were each able to obtain four (4) pots of rice, two (2) pots of peas and one-half (1/2) gallons of oil. During this intervention, sixty (60) prelates were also distributed;
- State authorities were unable to assist the victims according to their specific needs. For example, on October 30, 2018, Louisemona LISEBONNE went to the distribution site of the Directorate of Civil Protection (DPC) in order to claim a tarpaulin, her house having been seriously damaged by the earthquake. She refused the food kit which was offered to her instead of the tarpaulin requested. He was then promised to send it to her shortly. She is still waiting;
- State authorities were unable to coordinate aid distributions. These were sporadic and anarchic. Some have even led to injury. For example, on October 11, 2018, during a very poorly

The mismanagement of the earthquake of October 6, 2018 has proven that the Haitian state has not learned any lessons from January 12, 2010 and can in no way cope with an earthquake.

organized distribution by the First Lady of the Republic, Martine MOÏSE, a person came out injured after receiving an envelope containing money. After the First Lady's departure, the victim had to fight members of the public who were dissatisfied and furious at having received nothing, who had wanted to take her envelope.

- The state authorities were more concerned with propaganda than they were interested in actually helping the victims of the earthquake;
- State authorities were unable to coordinate the building assessment teams that were deployed in the field. They used color codes without providing information to the occupants of the houses. For example, in Morne Blocos, the RNDDH was able to read the mark "DPC" written in red on the walls of some houses. Questioned on the interpretation of this inscription, the owners of the houses, the municipal authorities met could not explain it.

XI. FINANCIAL BALANCE SHEET OF THE EARTHQUAKE OF JANUARY 12, 2010

107. The earthquake was managed financially in total opacity. The most forgiving ones report the mobilization of more than thirteen billion (13.000.000.000) US dollars. A lot of that was actually redistributed to large international humanitarian agencies that were on the ground, on a project basis. In addition, it should be noted that:

a) large sums were committed with the possibility that the authorities could use the law on the state of emergency throughout the territory. In fact, from 2010 to 2011, the state's resources were spent exceptionally, without any control, either in the first place or after the projects approved by the central authorities;

b) large sums of money have been mobilized from charitable organizations, cultural activities, etc. to help rebuild the country. Friendly countries of Haiti have committed themselves both to the IHRC and to the Haitian State to pay huge sums of money, on which little information has leaked;

c) The CIRH spent in the space of a few months an envelope estimated at two hundred and six million two hundred and seventy-two thousand (206,272,000) dollars. This is the only information that was posted on the website of this structure.

d) The then president of Venezuela Hugo Rafael Chavez Frias¹¹, in the aftermath of the earthquake, erased the debt contracted by Haiti from 2007 to 2010. At the same time, it continued to supply oil to the country, based on the same conditions. At that time, information on the Petrocaribe project was sparingly provided to the population.

108. Generally speaking, the various international humanitarian agencies and the Haitian institutions responsible for carrying out the projects did not provide precise information on the execution of the projects. And while few reporting efforts have been made by few organizations, no overall assessment of the financial management of the 12 January 2010 earthquake has been completed.

¹¹ Chavez cancels Haiti's debt of Petrocaribe, Le Nouvelliste, January 25, 2010
<https://lenouvelliste.com/article/78015/chavez-annule-la-dette-dhaiti-dans-le-cadre-de-petrocaribe>

109. Thus, in ten (10) years, the resources of the State, the amounts granted to Haiti on the basis of bilateral projects, the funds mobilized by international humanitarian organizations, the mobilized by the CIRH the funds of the Petrocaribe Project were spent in Haiti.

110. Projects funded by these funds were approved generally within the same period. This boondoggle has worked in favor of execution firms. For example, the Haiti Habitat 2020 Project was designed for the construction of high-rise social housing that meets seismic standards. Hundreds of families were to benefit from this project, which was to be implemented at Fort National. Not having been approved by the CIRH, this project was financed to the tune of forty-four (44) million US dollars by the Petrocaribe funds.



111. According to Jacques GABRIEL then Minister of Public Works, Transport and Communication, NABATEC, a firm resulting from the merger of the companies NABASA and TECINA, was the bearer of the project. The contract was awarded to R.M.N. and Constructora Rofi, two (2) firms belonging to the Dominican Senator Feliz BAUTISTA. The project was not carried out.

XII. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

112. The earthquake of January 12, 2010 caused enormous human and material losses. The Haitian state, brought to its knees by the catastrophe, was in total incapacity to assist the victims. As a result, the country would not have been able to survive without the aid of water, food, medical care, shelter, etc., offered by international humanitarian agencies. However, the RNDDH deplors the fact that the country was transformed into a market of humanitarian agencies, many of which fought for their visibility and for whose interventions, no results are available.

113. One of the first decisions taken by the state authorities at the time was to offer themselves the possibility of managing the disaster through several declaration of state of emergency on the national territory. This has allowed them to commit extraordinary amounts of money for projects whose results have remained invisible.

114. The spaces that were declared of public utility for the relocation of victims were, for the most part, not prepared to receive them. As a result, they quickly turned into slums. Some other relocation sites, prepared by humanitarian agencies, are now unhealthy. The semi-temporal shelters then offered, fell into decay. For its part, the 16/6 project implemented to dislodge the victims of sixteen (16) camps located at the time in Port-au-Prince, has accelerated the process of multiplication of shantytowns in many areas of the capital. Despite warnings from human rights organizations about the adverse effects of this project, it was carried out with the blessing of state authorities.

115. As part of this report, the RNDDH visited eighteen (18) accommodation camps and relocation sites. These visits allow him to affirm that the state authorities do not take into account the victims of the earthquake who are still living in infra-human conditions, without electricity, without access to drinking water, education, health care, latrines and without access to public transport.

116. In addition, the shelters of these victims are made up of tents and worn and punctured tarpaulins, unable to protect them from the weather. Forgotten by the Haitian State, they are the prey of armed bandits, the rare police antennas placed at their disposal are not equipped to come to the assistance of them during the commission of acts to attack lives and property.

117. Due to the absence of a policy of urbanization and the construction of social housing by the State, several occupants of the relocation sites have built houses in reinforced concrete.

118. Moreover, the downtown of Port-au-Prince has been partially declared of public utility. Some expropriated property owners were compensated. Others were expelled by armed individuals to whom the authorities had given the task to instill fear in the neighborhoods concerned, causing these owners to flee the affected areas. Of the collapsed buildings that were to be rebuilt there, some have actually been built while many others cannot even be traced.

119. At the same time, at the end of 2010, persons who had taken refuge in the camps, were violently evicted by private landowners who feared they would not be able make them leave if the situation continued. Those who had occupied the places or other public spaces were expelled by the state authorities. If some had received sums ranging from five thousand (5,000) to twenty thousand (20,000) gourdes, others, accused of causing disturbances to the public order and engaging in reprehensible acts, were chased away with stones, of shards of bottles or by fire put in some shelters.

120. For its part, the CIRH could not keep its promises. Managed in the most total opacity and having approved projects for huge sums of money, it is the greatest proof of the fiasco caused by the mismanagement of the earthquake by both the state authorities and the international community made up of friendly countries of Haiti and major humanitarian and development agencies. The Haitian society's expectations regarding this structure have not been met at all.

121. State authorities never miss an opportunity to affirm that the country can cope with an earthquake, having learned the lessons of January 12, 2010. The RNDDH believes that this is false. On the one hand, the population has not been trained on the behaviours to adopt before, during and after earthquakes. On the other hand, the mismanagement that was made of the earthquake that struck, on October 6, 2018, the departments of Northwest and Artibonite, has clearly demonstrated that the Haitian State was unable to organize the provision of health care to victims or to follow up on cases of concern, unable to deliver the aid in time, quality and quantity to the victims, unable to organize aid distributions with respect for human dignity and unable to coordinate the building assessment teams that had been deployed in the field.

122. The last ten (10) years have simply been used by state authorities to hide from eyes, the earthquake victims and get rid of them.

123. The last ten (10) years have also been used by candidates to promise victims the realization of their socio-economic rights and the improvement of their living conditions. After their election, they developed projects on their behalf that never saw the light of day.

124. The last ten (10) years have finally been used to further impoverish the Haitian population.

125. Today, accommodation camps and relocation sites have become part of Haiti's urban system. And no development plan for the country can be implemented without taking this population into account.

126. Based on these considerations, the RNDDH recommends that state authorities:

- Make the census of accommodation camps and relocation sites as well as of families living there;
- Implement social programs to support the victims of the earthquake of January 12, 2010;

- Equipping civil protection cells with a view to training the general population and school pupils on the behaviours to be adopted before, during and after natural disasters, including earthquakes;
- Supervise new construction to require compliance with seismic regulations