Tragic assassination of Jovenel MOÏSE: The president was delivered by security officials

August 20, 2021
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XI. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION

1. On the night of July 6-7, 2021, Jovenel MOÏSE, de facto President of the Republic of Haiti was assassinated in his residence at Pèlerin 5.

2. The same day, outgoing Prime Minister a.i. Claude JOSEPH claimed that this assassination was perpetrated by Colombian and Venezuelan mercenaries and that everything was under control. Since then, information has been coming from all sides, several subsequent events have been recorded and the most unlikely scenarios have been presented to the Haitian people who, paralyzed by this assassination, are still trying to understand what really happened.

3. The National Human Rights Defense Network (RNDDH), which, since July 8, 2021, has launched an investigation into this unprecedented event, intends today to share with the public, the conclusions of its investigations.

II. METHODOLOGY

4. As part of this investigation, the RNDDH consulted various reports of findings that were prepared by the justices of the peace required for this purpose. Subsequently, the RNDDH made several visits to the area where the presidential residence is located. It also met with:

- The Central Directorate of the Judicial Police (DCPJ);
- The General Inspection of the National Police of Haiti (IGPNH);
- The Directorate of the Penitentiary Administration (DAP);
- The Public Prosecutor’s Office at the Court of First Instance in Port-au-Prince;
- The Court of Peace of Pétion-ville;
- Agents of the General Security Unit of the National Palace (USGPN), detained in connection with this assassination;
- Agents of the Presidential Security Unit (USP) detained in connection with this assassination;
- Counter Ambush and Tactic Team (Cat Team) officers detained in connection with this assassination;
- Local residents of Pèlerin 5.

III. PRE-ASSASSINATION CONTEXT OF DE FACTO PRESIDENT JOVENEL MOÏSE

5. Since 2017, when the late Jovenel MOÏSE came to power, the general human rights situation in the country has been very worrying, if not catastrophic. Civil, political, social and cultural rights are constantly trampled by those who committed themselves to achieving them.
6. Insecurity is in full swing. Spectacular assassinations, kidnappings followed by kidnapping against ransom, collective rapes constitute the daily lot of Haitians. The elections were not held in time for the renewal of elected representatives. Contrary to campaign promises, the socio-economic situation of the people has deteriorated, and no recovery program has been set up. The state coffers have been looted. Inflation has never been higher.

7. However, more than anything, it is the phenomenon of gangsterization of state and country structures, officially appeared with the Haitian Têt Kale Party (PHTK) regime and reinforced with the administration of Jovenel MOÏSE, which caused – and still causes – the greatest harm in the country.

8. Armed gangs have federated and spread terror in the country, especially in disadvantaged neighborhoods where armed attacks and hegemonic wars have never ceased. Indeed, from 2018 to 2021, at least thirteen (13) massacres and armed attacks, perpetrated in Bel-Air, Cité Soleil, La Saline, etc. were documented by the RNDDH. As a result of these bloody events, at least four hundred and eighty-seven (487) people have been murdered, one hundred and twenty-nine (129) people have gone missing and at least thirty-three (33) women and girls have been gang raped.

9. Meanwhile, on June 1, 2021, in Martissant and Fontamara, a new war broke out between rival gangs located at the south entrance of the capital. Many people have been murdered, others have been forced to move under the indifferent gaze – some will say with complicity – of the administration of the late Jovenel MOÏSE. And those who have stayed at home or returned to their area of residence, live under the constant threat of gangs. Moreover, regularly, people, taken in pursuit on the boulevard Jean Jacques Dessalines, connecting Martissant and Fontamara both to the city of Port au-Prince and to the town of Carrefour, are victims by bullets. Four (4) geographic departments of the country and part of the Western Department are cut off from the rest of the national territory.

10. The demonstrations organized to demand the respect and the realization of the human rights of the population, were systematically and violently repressed by agents of the National Police of Haiti (PNH).

11. On February 7, 2021, the mandate of the late de facto President Jovenel MOÏSE ended. However, not wanting to leave power, he engaged in an uncertain struggle, arguing that given the date of his induction, he would not leave until 2022. To cling to power, he allowed himself all the blows as for example, the case of the Residence of Petit-Bois, in Tabarre where, on the night of February 6 to 7, 2021, eighteen (18) people including a judge at the Court of Cassation, a general inspector of the National Police of Haiti (PNH), agents of the PNH as well as other citizens, were arrested and imprisoned on charges of conspiracy against the internal security of the State and attack on the life of the President of the Republic.

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12. There is no need to point out that since the scandal caused by this case, the head of the General Security Unit of the National Palace (USGPN), Dimitri HÉRARD presented then as being the one who deflected the blow, became the whooping cough of the president who already granted him, a great confidence.

13. It should also be pointed out that towards the end of his mandate, Jovenel MOÏSE had also invested himself in very controversial projects such as the drafting of a new constitution, the organization of a referendum precisely in order to ratify the new constitution and the realization of presidential, partial legislative, municipal and local elections in the country. Yet human rights organizations, including the RNDDH, leaders of political parties as well as other organized groups in the country have never ceased to draw attention to the fact that the general security situation the control of territories hosting 60% of the electorate by armed gangs, do not provide the right climate for free, fair, democratic, inclusive and credible elections.

14. Meanwhile, Jovenel MOÏSE had not stopped attacking those whom he considered to be part of the radical political opposition and the corrupt oligarchy, his fierce opponents who prevented him from moving forward with great projects such as, 24/24 electricity for all, road construction and socio-economic development, in addition to the new constitution he wanted to endow the country, the one currently in force representing the cause of all the ills of Haitians.

15. In this untenable situation where living in Haiti was almost uncertain, a new surge in the Covid-19 pandemic resulted in the deaths of several people, some of whom were known. However, insecurity quickly became far more virulent than Covid-19 itself. And, above all, this insecurity has been aggravated by inaction and the marked lack of political will to remedy it.

16. It is therefore in this context of denial of human rights that on July 7, 2021, exactly five (5) months after the end of the presidential mandate, the Haitian population woke up with this news of the execution of de facto President Jovenel MOÏSE. This news paralyzed the country for no less than three (3) days, during which all economic and social activities were stopped.
IV. PRESENTATION OF THE HOUSE OF THE LATE PRESIDENT DE FACTO JOVENEL MOÏSE

17. The house where de facto President Jovenel MOÏSE lived is located in Pèlerin 5. It is accessible by two (2) ways: Thomassin and Pèlerin 5. The roads that lead there are, in part, made of clay and constitute in fact, real corridors.

18. A perimeter wall with a large wrought iron gate protects the presidential residence which is wedged between a bleak and a ravine. It serves as a channel for rainwater and used water from nearby homes. Mostly built on the mountainside, these houses dominate the courtyard of the presidential house, at the main entrance as well as at the rear.

19. To enter the courtyard through the main entrance, it is necessary to cross a bridge under which flows the water of the aforementioned ravine which itself separates the wall of enclosure from the adjacent houses.

20. On the right, by refusing the main entrance of the residence, one can take a dirt road giving access to the backyard, also overlooked by houses of which seven (7) were destroyed on July 7, 2018 by agents of the Intervention Corps for the Maintenance of Order (CIMO), at the express request of the Directorate General of Taxes (DGI), the Government Commissioner at the time at the Court of First Instance of Port-au-Prince, Me Clamé Ocnam DAMÉUS, the State Secretary for Public Security at the time, Léon Ronsard ST-CYR and the departmental director of the West of the PNH then, Berson SOLJOUR.

21. Finally, it should be noted that in 2016, an evaluation carried out by agents of the Counter Ambush and Tactic Team (Cat Team) had recommended the strengthening of the security of this house. This recommendation was never taken into account by those responsible.

V. PRESIDENT’S GENERAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION

22. According to the information gathered by the RNDDH, the security of the president, the national palace, his residence and his movements is ensured by three (3) specialized units: the Presidential Security Unit (USP), the Counter Ambush and Tactic Team (Cat Team) and the National Palace General Security Unit (USGPN). A coordinator ensures the planning and alignment of their work.
23. These three (3) units consist of at least six hundred and forty-seven (647) officers, of whom two hundred and thirty-two (232) are assigned to the USP, from whom are subtracted the ninety (90) Cat Team officers and four hundred fifteen (415) assigned to the USGPN. These specialized units have the following specific responsibilities.

1. Presidential Security Unit (USP)

24. The Presidential Security Unit (USP) is the President’s bodyguard team. In this capacity, USP agents are trained for the withdrawal of defense and the evacuation of the president from any place where he is. In this sense, they must have plans of the places where the president lives and works, as well as plans of the places he visits.

25. If, as mentioned above, the USP has a staff of two hundred and thirty-two (232) agents, from whom the ninety (90) Cat Team agents are subtracted, its actual staff differs because only forty (40) of them are active.

26. It was also reported to the RNDDH that in the case of the late de facto President Jovenel MOÏSE, USP agents did not have access to all parts of his private residence. Many of them did not even know the location of his room and had no defense and evacuation plan.

27. For better performance, USP agents must always be in training. But, in reality, this was not the case. For example, in two (2) and a half year, USP agents conducted a single shooting session. Of those who had been invited to fire twenty-five (25) rounds, only three (3) were able to reach their target irregularly.

28. The USP was malfunctioning. Officials were aware of this but did nothing to improve the situation. It was mostly overshadowed by the USGPN.

2. Counter Ambush and Tactic Team (Cat Team)

29. As an elite unit, the Counter Ambush and Tactic Team (Cat Team) is a branch of USP. It is considered to be the eye of the USP, without which it is ineffective.

30. The Cat Team has ninety (90) agents, of whom thirty-five (35) are on secondment to persons close to the de facto assassinated president.

31. The mission of the Cat Team, according to the officers met in the course of this investigation, is to ensure the security perimeters of the president, to participate as armed arms, in presidential processions, plan and participate in the execution of the President’s travel routes and missions.
32. As an elite unit of the USP, the Cat Team possesses numerous weapons and ammunition to deal with armed attacks and to protect the president and his family. However, according to the information gathered over the past few years, the stock of weapons and ammunition has not been renewed. On the contrary, it has diminished due to the fact that the other units assigned to presidential security often borrow from the Cat Team.

3. National Palace General Security Unit (USGPN)

33. The General Security Unit of the National Palace (USGPN) is called to secure the entourage of the palace and all other places where the president would be. It has four hundred and fifty (450) staff, many of whom are inactive.

34. The USGPN agents are the furthest from the president because, in the event of aggression, they are responsible for repelling the attackers while those of the Cat Team must on their part provide cover and defense to allow those of the USGPN to proceed with the evacuation of the president.

35. It has also been reported to the RNDDH that many USGPN agents are on secondment with personalities close to power. This is the case of agents of the USGPN who provide the security of a Mayor of Les Cayes for more than three (3) years, the security of ministers and that of former senators. Many are also called upon to secure convoys of rice trucks, especially for transport in the Great South. And, at least one (1) officer is assigned to the safety of an engineer living in Les Cayes.

VI. PRESIDENT’S SECURITY COORDINATION

36. In reality, coordination between these units was not effective. In particular, USGPN agents are accused of disorganizing the President’s security work and of placing themselves, by their behavior, above USP agents.

37. Indeed, they did not respect their scope of actions, occupied the perimeters of the USP and the Cat Team. They did not get orders from the escort people. In this sense, correspondence denouncing this state of affairs had been sent to those responsible, but no follow-up was recorded.

38. In fact, according to several people met in the course of this investigation, it is since the arrival of Dimitri HÉRARD at the head of the USGPN that the order of things was reversed, because he had all the confidence of the president.

1. President’s Residence Security Organization

39. Two (2) fixed patrols consisting of the Intervention Corps for the Maintenance of Order (CIMO) and the Departmental Unit for the Maintenance of Order (UDMO) are respectively posted in a vehicle of the PNH and in a container, a few meters from the house. The officers assigned there must
40. We then find the agents of the General Security Unit of the National Palace (USGPN) normally placed a few meters before those of the Cat Team. And finally, USP agents must be scattered on the courtyard and inside the presidential house.

41. Two (2) surveillance cameras are also placed on the site, one at the residence barrier and the other at the entrance to Pèlerin 5. However, monitoring is placed in the victim’s room.

42. In addition, one (1) vehicle containing surplus weapons and ammunition, for the purpose of preparing for any attack, is normally parked on the courtyard of the residence.

2. Security Organization Overnight July 6-7, 2021

43. During the night of July 6-7, 2021, twenty-three (23) officers were stationed at the President’s residence. There should have been twenty-four (24) team leaders: three (3) team leaders at the rate of one leader per specialized unit, nine (9) USGPN officers, responsible for guarding the entrance to the residence, six (6) Cat Team officers responsible for securing the north side of the residence and six (6) USP agents, tasked with securing the court.

44. Jeanty HUBERT, the USP Team Leader, the President’s bodyguard unit, was absent from his position for personal convenience.

45. The above officers had three (3) Galil rifles and two (2) M4 rifles at their disposal. The USP officers also had their pistols at their disposal.

VII. BACKGROUND TO THE ASSASSINATION OF JOVENEL MOÏSE

46. From January to June 2021, several individuals returned to Haiti, among them at least three (3) Americans of Haitian origin, one (1) Venezuelan and twenty-two (22) Colombians. According to them, the latter were recruited by the Counter Terrorist Unit (CTU) to provide security work in Haiti, paid between two thousand seven hundred (2,700) and three thousand (3,000) US dollars per month per person.

- Some of these individuals arrived in January 2021 and were taken to the Maxime Boutique Hotel, located at # 74, Bois Moquette, Pétion-ville.

- On April 19, 2021, Vincent JOSEPH and James SOLAGES entered Haiti. They presented themselves to the agents of the PNH who had been tasked to collect them, as being respectively an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and an employee of the

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Department of Justice of the United States. They were also taken to the Maxime Boutique Hotel, located in Petion-ville.

- In May 2021, Emmanuel Antonio INTRIAGO alias Tony, Jean PIERRE and Christian Emmanuel SANON arrived. They were taken to Samir Handal’s house in Delmas 60.

- On June 6, 2021, twenty-two (22) individuals recruited by the Counter Terrorist Unit (CTU) entered Haiti. Fifteen (15) of them were installed at the hotel and the other seven (7) were taken to the house where Christian Emmanuel SANON lived. Subsequently, to complete the task for which they were recruited, they arranged to work in shifts of five (5) officers.

47. Numerous meetings were held from January 2021 until the assassination of Jovenel MOÏSE. Some meetings were held at the International Medical Village, Corvington Security S.A., Camacho Sécurité S.A., Maxime Boutique Hotel, Counter Terrorist Unit (CTU) and Château Host Hotel. Other meetings were held in private houses, one of which is owned by Samir HANDAL, based in Delmas 60. Two (2) houses respectively located at #11, Rue des Pilonnes, Delmas 31, and # 10, Pèlerin 6, were also used to host these meetings. At least one (1) meeting was held at the home of the magistrate of the Court of Cassation, Wendelle Coq THELOT.

48. In addition to the magistrate Wendelle Coq THELOT, many well-known personalities were pointed out as having participated in one or more meetings with the individuals involved in the assassination of the de facto president. They include Paul DENIS, Harrisson ERNEST and John Joël JOSEPH.

49. In addition, about three (3) weeks before the murder of the victim, by order of Divisional Commissioner Jean Laguel CIVIL, Safety Coordinator of the President, the vehicle, containing weapons and ammunition, usually placed on the courtyard of the residence was put outside. The coordinator justified his order by the fact that the president often complained about the presence of too many vehicles on his court.

50. It should be noted that according to the information gathered by the RNDDH, since two (2) weeks before his assassination, Jovenel MOÏSE no longer went to the National Palace. On several occasions, he even had his procession moved without going there himself, which suggests that he feared for his life. This fear was confirmed by an alert to the attack on the president that had been launched. According to the plans of this alert, it was planned to attack Jovenel MOÏSE while he was on his way or when he was in the national palace. Consequently, his assassination, as it happened on the night of July 6 to 7, 2021, was probably only a third plan, his killers having understood that he had suspicions about the initial plans.
51. Divisional Commissioner Jean Laguel CIVIL, Safety Coordinator to the President, was informed of this alert. He touched the head of the USGPN, Commissioner Dimitri HÉRARD. However, no measures to enhance the security of the President have been taken.

1. Mission Planning

52. The initial mission as known by several people met by the RNDDH seems to have been to arrest de facto President Jovenel MOÏSE on the basis of an arrest warrant issued on February 18, 2019 by the magistrate instructor Jean Roger NOËLCIUS, for acts of murder committed in the context of the La Saline massacre, which occurred on November 13-14, 2018.

53. After his arrest, de facto President Jovenel MOÏSE should have been replaced by Christian Emmanuel SANON or by the magistrate Wendell Coq THELOT.

54. In addition, known political figures as well as several other individuals were presented to the RNDDH as having adhered to the arrest project. They include Ashkard Joseph PIERRE, Maître Gordon Phenil DÉSIR, former Senator of the Republic John Joël JOSEPH, Magistrate Wendell Coq THELOT and Doctor Harisson ERNEST. These personalities were also likely to occupy important positions in the transitional government which would then be set up.

55. According to what the RNDDH has learned, fourteen (14) people are mainly involved in the preparation of the initial mission to arrest Jovenel MOÏSE. These are the following:

- James SOLAGES
- Christian Emmanuel SANON
- Joseph Félix BADIO
- Joseph VINCENT
- Reynaldo CORVINGTON
- Dominick CAUVIN
- Rodolphe JAAR Alias Dòdòf
- Gilbert DRAGON
- Angel NAVARO
- Walter VEINTEMILLA
- Duberney Giraldo CAPADOR aka Manuel
- Emmanuel Antonio INTRIAGO aka Tony
- Archangel PRETEL ORTIZ aka Gabriel
- German Alejandro RIVERA GARCIA aka Colonel Mike
56. They were in constant communication with:

- Dimitri HÉRARD
- Jean Laguel CIVIL
- John Joël JOSEPH

57. However, all other Colombian nationals who were not directly involved in the preparation of the mission had to participate actively.

58. The distribution of tasks within the group was as follows:

- Christian Emmanuel SANON was in charge of the overall coordination of the coup that was to lead to his accession to power.

- Dimitri HÉRARD, was responsible for supplying weapons and ammunition to commando members including assault rifles, tear gas canisters, hand grenades and power saws;

- Rodolphe JAAR aka Dodof was responsible for collecting and storing mission material before distributing it to commando members at the appropriate time. In this sense, at least fourteen (14) firearms and six (6) vehicles, mobilized for the commission of the crime, were held at his home.

- Gilbert DRAGON was responsible for providing DEA badges to the team;

- John Joël JOSEPH was responsible for paying the rental of vehicles in cash;

- Jean Laguel CIVIL was in charge of bribing agents assigned to the security of the president in order to allow a smooth entry of the commando in the residence of Jovenel MOïSE. It had in its possession about one hundred thousand (100,000) US dollars.

- Joseph Félix BADIO was responsible for receiving real-time information about the victim’s actions. For this, he rented an apartment in front of the president’s house and was in permanent contact with Marie Jude Gilbert DRAGON who provided him with this information; On this point, it should be noted that the divisional inspector Jude LAURENT, USP agent, assigned to the security of the presidential residence was, in the past, attached to the close security of Marie Jude Gilbert DRAGON when he was police commissioner. They kept close ties and, it is to the divisional inspector Jude LAURENT that it was to inform in real time, Marie Jude Gilbert DRAGON who herself, relayed the information to Joseph Félix
Duberney Giraldo CAPADOR and German Alejandro Riviera GARCIA alias colonel Mike, were in charge of the reconnaissance of the place. To do this, they went, three (3) times to the top of the mountain that overlooks the President’s house.

59. The mission was funded in large part by Walter VEINTENILLA, a foreign national who had promised to give him the free rein to implement an electricity company in the country. He currently heads the Worldwide Capital Lending Group. He is also described as one of the leaders of the Counter Terrorist Unit (CTU).

60. On the day of the mission, members of the commando, were to be posted outside and only a few influential members of the commando whose German Alejandro Riviera GARCIA alias Mike were in charge of breaking into the premises and apprehending Jovenel MOÏSE.

VIII. RECONSTITUTION OF THE FACTS

61. To reconstruct the facts, the RNDDH first drew on the various minutes that were drawn up by the magistrates of the peace that had been requested, from July 8 to 17, 2021. Subsequently, the RNDDH met with those arrested in connection with the assassination. The information gathered allowed us to understand the following:

62. On the night of July 6-7, 2021, police officers Bony GRÉGOIRE, William MOÏSE, Elie JEAN CHARLES and Joseph Félix BADIO were in charge of recovering the other members of the commando. In total, there were twenty-eight (28): the three (3) police officers mentioned above, twenty-two (22) Colombians, two (2) Americans of Haitian origin and Joseph Félix BADIO. Six (6) vehicles were mobilized for the operation.

63. Around 1:35 in the morning, these heavily armed individuals broke into the security perimeter of the residence of de facto President Jovenel MOÏSE. Since no alerts were issued, they were able to easily pass the first security wall composed of CIMO agents.

64. The main gate of the house was left open as planned. However, when they broke in, the commando took a few shots. There were exchanges of shots.

65. From the first shots, Jovenel MOÏSE began making calls. The director general a.i. of the PNH, Léon CHARLES, the coordinator of security, the divisional commissioner Jean Laguel CIVIL as well as the head of the USGPN, Commissioner Dimitri HÉRARD were all contacted by him. They all promised to send him reinforcements immediately.
66. James SOLAGES with a megaphone, invited the PNH officers not to shoot and stated that this was an DEA operation. A few agents, some of whom were inside the building, nevertheless continued to shoot, which led James SOLAGES to warn them against the DEA’s retaliation.

67. This ruse seemed to work even though later some officers met with the RNDDH will say that they were in fact short of ammunition.

68. The names of at least nine (9) members of the commando are cited as those who had entered the residence and some of them, in the President’s Chamber. They are Victor Albeiro Pineda CARDONA alias Pipe, Naiser Franco CASTANEDA, Juan Carlos Yepes CLAVIJO, Neil Caceres DURAN, Duberney GIRALDO CAPADOR alias Manuel, Manuel Antonio Grosso GUARIN, Carlos Giovanni GUERRERO TORRES, Javier Romero MEDINA and Alejandro Giraldo ZAPATA. After having duly identified him, they coldly shot him with several projectiles.

69. The wife of the victim Martine MOÏSE and two (2) children of the presidential couple Jomarlie Jovenelle MOÏSE and Jovenel Junior MOÏSE were on the scene. The first was injured during the operation. The other two (2) had time to hide.

70. Many calls were made by Jovenel MOÏSE, from 1: 36 to 1: 46 in the morning. None of the people he seemed to be relying on to protect him came forward. Inspector General André Jonas Vladimir PARAISON is one of the last people he spoke with. He was the first to arrive on the scene. And he was the one who organized the evacuation of Martine MOÏSE.

71. Several suitcases containing large sums of money, documents as well as the servers of the surveillance cameras of the residence, were taken by the commando who had entered the house.

72. According to several officers of the specialized units met by the RNDDH that evening, they were surprised by a true military intervention. The attackers had drones, grenades, high-caliber rifles, night vision goggles, hammers and axes. For their part, the PNH agents on the scene had neither the means nor the capacity to resist this attack. They also claimed that the displacement of the vehicle that contained a surplus of weapons and ammunition and that was on the presidential court, helped reduce their ability to respond.

73. As a result, although some attempted to retaliate, they had to withdraw very quickly due to a lack of ammunition. In addition, Agent Renor FONTUS himself team leader of the Cat Team, short of ammunition, hid in the backyard of the residence of Jovenel MOÏSE. The other agents have quickly put down their weapons. They were more concerned about saving their lives than protecting the presidential family.

74. On July 7, 2021, early in the morning, Martine MOÏSE was taken to a hospital in the capital before being quickly evacuated to Miami.
75. At about ten (10) o'clock in the morning, Justice of the Peace Carl Henry DESTIN made a statement of the corpse of Jovenel MOÏSE, drew up minutes of it before ordering the lifting of the body, which will be carried out only at five (5) o'clock in the afternoon. In addition, according to the report, Jovenel MOÏSE received twelve (12) projectiles: one (1) in the head, one (1) in the left eye, one (1) in the forehead, one (1) in the left ear, two (2) in the chest, one (1) in the left forearm, one (1) in the right thigh and four (4) projectiles to the back.

76. At approximately 10:30 in the morning, forensic officers (CSI) were able to enter the scene of the crime to begin their investigation.

IX. LOCATION OF THE HEADS OF THE SPECIALIZED UNITS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE PRESIDENT

77. Taking into account that an alert had been launched and that the life of de facto President Jovenel MOÏSE was threatened, the location at the time of the tragedy, of the heads of the specialized units responsible for the security of the latter, is important for the RNDDH.

1. Divisional Commissioner Jean Laguel CIVIL, President’s Security Coordinator

78. Divisional Commissioner Jean Laguel CIVIL coordinates the security of the President.

79. He was at his home in Thomassin when, around one o’clock in the morning, he received a call from the president informing him that gunfire was being heard in the vicinity of his home and asking for a back-up to strengthen his security.

80. Divisional Commissioner Jean Laguel CIVIL claims to have immediately called Commissioner Dimitri HÉRARD, himself responsible for the USGPN and Chief Inspector Paul Eddy AMAZAN, responsible for the Cat Team, before taking the road towards the victim’s residence. If they were able to muster their troops quickly, they only arrived near the residence before being stopped by the commando himself who informed them that it was a DEA operation.

2. Commissioner Pierre Osman LÉANDRE responsible for the USP

81. USP member since 2003, Police Commissioner Pierre Osman LÉANDRE is promoted to Chief Officer of USP on June 18, 2020. His main responsibility was to establish the connection between presidential security coordination and field teams.

82. On the night of July 6-7, 2021, he was at home when he received a call around three o’clock in the morning from Divisional Inspector Péguy TOUSSAINT, himself the USP’s chief of operations.
informing him of the attack on the president’s residence. He quickly called Divisional Commissioner Jean Laguel CIVIL who confirmed the facts and asked him to go to the national palace. A little later, he spoke with Inspector Paul Eddy AMAZAN who told him that everything was under control.

3. Lead Inspector Paul Eddy AMAZAN, Cat Team Lead

83. Lead Inspector Paul Eddy AMAZAN comes from the thirteenth (13th) promotion of the PNH. He has worked at the National Palace for twenty (20) years. However, for eighteen (18) years, he has been assigned to the Cat Team.

84. On the night of July 6-7, 2021, Lead Inspector Paul Eddy AMAZAN was at his home. At approximately 1:45 in the morning, he was informed by Constable Willet CANGÉ, himself the Cat Team Chief of Operations, that the President’s house was under attack. He called other agents from the specialized units. Together, they went to the national palace in order to recover firearms and ammunition before taking the direction of Pèlerin 5. Arrived in Petion-ville, they met the director general a. i. of the PNH who asked them to go to secure the national palace. He and the accompanying officers returned.

85. Lead Inspector Paul Eddy AMAZAN also stated that he had already forwarded his detailed report to the USP official.

4. Commissioner Dimitri HÉRARD, USGPN Lead

86. Commissioner Dimitri HÉRARD is the Head of the USGPN.

87. On the night of July 6-7, 2021, he was at home in Péguy-ville, when he received a call from presidential security coordinator Jean Laguel CIVIL. Subsequently, he was called by the president himself who confirmed the information.

88. He quickly took charge of the President’s house. However, arriving in the vicinity of the fixed patrol composed of CIMO officers, he was ordered to withdraw from the perimeter because the DEA was in operation. He and the other officers accompanying him complied with the order and withdrew.

X. SUBSEQUENT FACTS

89. The day after the assassination of Jovenel MOÏSE, the Haitian capital was in turmoil. The outgoing Prime Minister, Claude JOSEPH, quickly confirmed the assassination of de facto President Jovenel MOÏSE, who had taken the reins of the country. He said that everything was under control. At the same time, a constant communication team was set up and the twists of the investigation were eagerly followed by the population.
1. Autopsy of the corpse of Jovenel MOÏSE

90. On July 10, 2021, the autopsy of the corpse of the late Jovenel MOÏSE was performed. Analysis, excavations, deformations and abnormal mobility of several parts of the body, including the skull, the frontal bone, the nasal bone, the left leg, were noted. In addition, fifteen (15) entry and exit holes, both chest, right buttock, right forearm and right thigh wounds were noted. And, fractures to the left leg and toe as well as fragments of projectiles have been spotted in several parts of the body. Finally, because of the various remarks made about the corpse by the medical examiner whose heart decay, the death of the victim is reported due to the bursting of his heart by a bullet.

2. Police Response and Judicial Police Investigation

91. Several police interventions resulted in the deaths of at least three (3) individuals of Colombian nationality. In addition, at least twelve (12) searches were carried out by the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police (DCPJ) in private hotels and houses belonging to the persons mentioned in this file. Sixty-one (61) firearms, fifty (50) mobile phones and eight (8) vehicles were seized.

3. Persons killed by police

92. On July 8, 2021, the justice of the peace holder of the Court of Peace of Pétion-ville, Maître Clément NOËL, required for this purpose, found the corpses of two (2) Colombian nationals who were killed in Morne calvaire. They are Mauricio Javier ROMERO and Duberney CAPADOR GIRALDO. However, their bodies were transported not far from the offices of the Office d'Assurance Véhicules Contre Tiers (OAVCT) for the purpose of observation.

93. They had in their possession forty thousand (40,000) US dollars, nineteen thousand (19,000) gourdes, mobile phones, cartridges, a balaclava, a bulletproof vest, a metal tongs, food products, plastic handcuffs and president’s business cards.

94. On the same day, another Colombian national was killed: Miguel GUILLERMO GARZON. His body was also found by magistrate Clément NOËL.

4. Searches

95. In the majority of buildings searched by DCPJ, suspicious objects were found. For example:

- On July 9, 2021, in Delmas 60, not far from the United Nations Office for Project Support Services (UNOPS), in a house belonging to Samir HANDAL, where Emmanuel Christian SANON resided, license plates including three (3) issued by the Dominican Republic and two (2) by the Republic of Haiti, Haitian and Palestinian passports, mobile phones,
checkbooks, an Entry/Exit seal from the Immigration and Emigration Directorate, notes drawn from foreign banks, Laptop computers, hard drives, fire targets, cartridge boxes, weapons and weapons cases were discovered.

- On July 10, 2021, in Belvil, in a house owned by former senator John Joël JOSEPH, checkbooks gourdes and dollars drawn on the Unibank, bank cards in the name of John Joël JOSEPH, mobile phones, cartridges, rifles 12, A shotgun, gun cases, flash drives, were found.

- On July 12, 2021, in three (3) different buildings: the Maxime Boutique Hotel located in Bois Moquette, the Camacho Sécurité S.A., located in Pèlerin 5 as well as in a private house located at number 10, Pèlerin 6, weapons, ammunition and boots were discovered. According to the people met at the scene, these boots belonged to members of the commando who carried out the mission.

- On July 12, 2021, at number 10, Pèlerin 6, a rifle, grenades, cartridge boxes, bullet proof vests, gun cases and marijuana-like leaves were observed.

- On July 16, 2021, at the Château Host Hotel, located at Pèlerin 2, a building belonging to Ms. Josepha GAUTHIER, twenty-two (22) weapons of different calibers, cartridges and vehicles were discovered.

96. On July 18, 2021, the wife of the victim Martine MOÏSE and the children of the presidential couple went to the residence together with the Minister of Justice Rockefeller VINCENT, a justice of the peace and the government commissioner of Port-au-Prince, Maître Bed-Ford CLAUDE. Martine MOÏSE then demanded from the Minister of Justice the arrest of Joseph Félix BADIO. This request proves, if necessary, that it holds precise information on the account of Joseph Félix BADIO and that it knew the relations between the latter and the minister.

5. Persons Arrested

97. To date, at least forty-four (44) persons have been arrested. These include:

- Eighteen (18) Colombian nationals:
  - Jhon Jader ANDELA
  - Edwin Enrique Blanquicet RODRIGUEZ
  - Naiser Franco CASTAÑEDA
  - Jheyner Alberto Carmona FLOREZ
  - Neil Caceres DURAN

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Manuel Antonio Groso GUARINI
Carlos Giovanni Guerrero TORRES, retired from the Colombian army, Lieutenant Colonel
Gersain Mendivelso JAIMES, retired from the Colombian army
Jhon Jairo Ramírez GOMEZ
German Alejandro Rivera GARCIA aka Mike retired from the Colombian army since 2012.
Alex Miyer Peña retired from the Colombian army since 2018
Victor Albeiro Pineda CARDONA
Jhon Jairo Suárez ALEGRÍA
Francisco Eladio Uribe OCHOA
Enalber Vargas GOMEZ retired from the Colombian army since March 23, 2016
Angel Mario Yarce SIERRA
Juan Carlos Yepes CLAVIJO
Alejandro Girardo ZAPATA

Three (3) Haitian Americans, namely Christian Emmanuel SANON, James SOLAGES and Joseph VINCENT, were arrested.

Twenty (20) PNH officers be the National Palace General Security Coordinator, the three (3) responsible for USGPN, USP and Cat Team, the three (3) Team Leaders of USP, USGPN and Cat Team, three (3) Cat Team officers, six (6) USP officers, three (3) CIMO officers and one (1) SDPJ officer / West:

Jean Laguel CIVIL, General Security Coordinator of the National Palace
Dimitry HERARD, USGPN Lead
Pierre Osman LEANDRE, USP Manager
Paul Eddy AMAZAN, Cat Team Manager
Conrad BASTIEN, USGPN Team Leader
Hubert JEANTY, USP Team Leader
Renor FONTUS, Cat Team Leader
Frantz LOUIS, Cat Team
Arly JEAN, Cat Team
Faneck DELICAT, Cat Team
Sadrac ALPHONSE, USP
Rony FRANCOIS, USP
Ernst GERMAIN, USP
o Ronald GUERRIER, USP
o Jude LAURENT, USP
o Cleantis LOUSSAINT, USP
o Clifton HYPPOLITE, CIMO
o Elie JEAN CHARLES, CIMO
o Bony GREGOIRE, CIMO
o Williams MOÏSE, SDPJ / Ouest

• Three (3) other individuals, Reynaldo CORVINGTON and Dominick CAUVIN, both (2) responsible for Corvington Security S.A. and Marie Jude Gilbert DRAGON were also arrested.

98. Of these persons, four (4) in particular are of interest to the RNDDH because their names have been cited by virtually all those arrested either as authors, co-authors or as having actively participated in the mission.

• Emmanuel Christian SANON born on November 22, 1958 was arrested on July 9, 2021. He was in a house in Delmas 60, not far from the UNOPS office, owned by Samir HANDAL. Around 2015 or 2016, he worked in a clinic located in the Canapé-vert where he extorted between six hundred (600) and three thousand (3,000) US dollars to young people, promising to allow them to take a training in nursing in the United States of America. And subsequently, he provided them with a certificate of completion on a headquartered level of Phenix University, without they had participated in the promised training.

99. It should also be noted that on the day of the arrest of Emmanuel Christian SANON, July 9, 2021, Samir HANDAL, against whom a warrant to bring had been issued, was escorted to the Toussaint Louverture International Airport, by the National Police of Haiti (PNH), in order to leave the country.

• James SOLAGES was apprehended on July 7, 2021 while in Pétion-ville. He quickly confirmed to the magistrate of peace Clément NOEL that he is a translator, speaking French, English and Spanish. He also said that he was the one talking to the megaphone.
• Joseph VINCENT born on September 28, 1965, is an American of Haitian origin. He was arrested on July 8, 2021. He said he lived in Florida, in the United States. He was also a translator, according to what he said. He also claimed that the individuals had in their possession a warrant issued by the investigating judge Jean Roger NOËLCIUS.

• Joseph Félix BADIO is legal adviser to Corvinton Security S.A. He is presented as a former employee of the Anti-Corruption Unit (ULCC) and considered a close relative of the current Minister of Justice, Maître Rockfeller VINCENT.

6. Conditions of Detention and Detention

100. Following their incarceration at the Civil Prison of Port-au-Prince, the RNDDH met with some of them. Some claimed to have been tortured by agents of the Research and Intervention Brigade (BRI) while they were at the DCPJ. This is the case for example of Reynaldo CORVINGTON, James SOLAGES and Joseph VINCENT respectively aged sixty-eight (68) years, fifty-six (56) years and thirty-six (36) years, who were severely beaten. Others denounced the fact that BRI officers used harmful substances to force them to speak.

101. In addition, at the DCPJ, Christian Emmanuel SANON had to spend the night on a chair while being handcuffed before joining the others, forced to sleep on the floor. They did not have access to visits. They also did not have access to legal counsel.

102. Their current conditions of detention are of great concern. Water used for the bath causes itching and rashes in some people. The food is of very poor quality and insufficient.

103. Some of them are incarcerated in isolation cells that are juxtaposed with a corridor in which feces, waste and water are thrown.

104. The RNDDH also learned that through their consulate, Colombians sent correspondence to their family members, in order to request, among other things, the assistance of a lawyer.

7. Cross Calls

105. Before, during and after the assassination of Jovenel MOÏSE, the telephones of the aforementioned persons, as well as those of those arrested, were in constant contact.

106. In addition, Joseph Félix BADIO, whose telephone was transmitting in the vicinity of the house of Jovenel MOÏSE, was in close contact with several personalities. For example, on the night of the

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assassination, Prime Minister Ariel HENRY spoke by telephone with both Joseph Félix BADIO and the president.

107. Magistrate Wendell Coq THELOT also met with Joseph Félix BADIO.

8. Status of Clerks Accompanying Justices of the Peace

108. Two (2) clerks of the Court of Peace of Pétion-Ville who assisted the justices of the peace in the case of the assassination of de facto President Jovenel MOÏSE are the subject of death threats. They are Marcelin VALENTIN, Chief Clerk of the said court and Waky PHILOSTÈNE, one of his assistants. They had to assist the magistrates of peace during the various observations and searches of homes, carried out in the context of the assassination of Jovenel MOÏSE.

109. Both (2) received messages on their respective mobile phones. In addition, in a letter addressed to the Chief of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, Marcelin VALENTIN denounced the fact that he was asked to remove and add the names of known political figures in the various reports that he had to draw up. On July 17, 2021, the messages received were noted by a magistrate of the peace.

9. Transfer of the file to the investigating office of Magistrate Mathieu Chanlatte

110. On August 9, 2021, the investigating judge Mathieu CHANLATTE was appointed by the dean at the Court of First Instance of Port-au-Prince, Bernard SAINT-VIL.

111. However, in the opinion of the RNDDH, this is a very questionable choice, because the magistrate has, in the near past, been partisan in the treatment of the files entrusted to him. For example:

- On November 8, 2019, the Haitian State filed a complaint against Réginald Marc Jean VORBE, Jean Marie VORBE, Albert Edouard Dimitri VORBE and Agnès Elizabeth DÉBROSSE, managers of the electricity distribution company SOGENER for forgery and use of forgery, criminal association, fraud and money laundering. The dean of the Court of First Instance of Port-au-Prince, Bernard SAINT-VIL had chosen magistrate Merlan BELABRE for the investigation of the case. On July 7, 2020, the prosecutor’s office sent a new indictment to inform the dean, given the fact that he had received a new complaint from the Haitian state. Dean Bernard SAINVIL decided to split the case and to choose Magistrate Mathieu CHANLATTE. He then issued an order dated July 27, 2020, in which he ordered the seizure and freezing of the assets and funds belonging to the aforementioned defendants, the seizure of the immovables belonging to them and any other property likely to constitute the proceeds of the crimes and offences for which they are prosecuted.
112. On 13 August 2021, in an order issued by the magistrate Mathieu CHANLATTE, the latter deported himself from the case, for, according to his statements, personal convenience.

XI. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

113. On the night of July 6-7, 2021, the unthinkable happened: a commando broke into the private residence of de facto President Jovenel MOÏSE and shot him.

114. In order to implement their macabre plan, the intellectual and material authors of this assassination were able to count on the support of at least two (2) heads of presidential security, Divisional Commissioner Jean Laguel CIVIL and Municipal Commissioner Dimitri HÉRARD, respectively General Security Coordinator of the President and Chief Officer of the USGPN. Chief Inspector Paul Eddy AMAZAN and Police Commissioner Pierre Osman LÉANDRE, themselves in charge of the USP and the Cat Team, were in fact no longer involved in the organization of the safety of the late Jovenel MOÏSE, the latter having decided to place all his trust in those who betrayed him, thus disorganizing the work of the USP and the Cat Team.

115. It is therefore a flagrant case of violations of the rights to life and security of the late de facto President Jovenel MOÏSE, perpetrated by persons vested with state authority who had been entrusted with protecting the victim.

116. This being clearly stated; several considerations must also be made.

117. Colombian nationals claimed to have been recruited to ensure the safety of Christian Emmanuel SANON. They should have thought twice before agreeing to participate in an illegal mission to arrest a sitting president. Moreover, without taking into account – for a moment – the function of the victim, it should be recalled that these Colombian nationals were not part of the International Criminal Police Organization commonly known as INTERPOL. Nor did they carry an international warrant issued against the victim. So, they had knowingly agreed to be involved in a flagrant case of attack on the internal security of the Haitian state, today aggravated by the assassination of a president in office.
118. If the mission known by the majority of the members of the commando had been to make the arrest of Jovenel MOÏSE, some other members knew that the victim would be murdered. The RNDDH wants as to proof the fact that de facto President Jovenel MOÏSE had been duly identified before being riddled with bullets. Twelve (12) to fifteen (15) projectiles shall not be administered to a person whose murder was not intended.

119. The names of nine (9) Colombians are cited as those who broke into the presidential residence and then into the victim’s room. Two (2) of them were subsequently killed. According to police authorities, this happened during exchanges of fire. On this point, it is to the general inspection of the National Police of Haiti (PNH) that it will be up to elucidate the conditions under which these individuals were killed. But as for the seven (7) other Colombian nationals who had invested the presidential residence, they are all directly involved in the assassination of the president. They were, without a doubt, those who knew that de facto President Jovenel MOÏSE was going to die.

120. Taking into account the warnings about the threats that had been launched against the president, the RNDDH does not understand that the various intelligence services of the country have not been set in motion. Similarly, it is incomprehensible that, on full alert, all the heads of the specialized units assigned to the de facto president’s security were at home.

121. The members of the Superior Council of the National Police (CSPN) all have an intelligence service. Each year they receive an amount from the country’s budget for the operation of their respective service. However, none of these services could prevent the assassination of de facto President Jovenel MOÏSE. Worse, they have so far not cooperated in the judicial police investigation. However, the RNDDH believes that at least three (3) of them are particularly important:

- The Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Authorities has control of the entries and exits recorded on Haitian soil, via the directorates of immigration and emigration. The sudden movement of all these Colombian nationals should not have escaped him and, the intelligence service attached to this ministry should have informed Minister Louis Gonzague Edner DAY.

- The Minister of Justice and Public Security Rockefeller VINCENT, for his part, maintains very close relations with Joseph Félix BADIO. A good collaboration of his intelligence cell should be able to help locate this individual whose name was cited by the majority of those arrested in the course of this investigation.
• The director general a.i. of the PNH Leon CHARLES received at least two (2) distress calls from the president, just before his assassination. He promised to send reinforcements immediately. This was not done. Consequently, the constraints that led him not to intervene, should be known to the judicial police.

122. At this stage, it is also not superfluous to recall that the national palace also has an intelligence service that did not help save the president’s life any more than the National Intelligence Agency (ANI) created on November 25, 2020, by the victim herself.

123. The RNDDH believes that Martine MOÏSE, wife of the late de facto President Jovenel MOÏSE, holds much more precise information about the murder of her husband than what she kindly shared with the international press. It has made statements, some of which are difficult to make sense of. More than anything, the RNDDH believes that the fact that she demanded of the Minister of Justice Rockefeller VINCENT, the arrest of Joseph Félix BADIO, suggests that she has details on the level of involvement of the latter in the murder of her husband.

124. Like the director general a.i. of the PNH, the divisional commissioner Jean Laguel CIVIL and the commissioner Dimitri HÉRARD were called by the late de facto president Jovenel MOÏSE. None of them intervened despite their promises. And, the principal inspector Paul Eddy AMAZAN as well as the police commissioner Pierre Osman LÉANDRE, respectively responsible for the USP and the Cat Team did not perform the work for which they are paid. Yet no member of the presidential security chain has resigned, which is unacceptable.

125. Several specialized agents, assigned to the security of de facto President Jovenel MOÏSE, were bribed to allow the commando in charge of arresting the latter, according to what they had been told. While acknowledging that they may not have known that Jovenel MOÏSE was to be assassinated, the RNDDH believes that this does not detract from the gravity of their betrayal. They facilitated the murder of the victim and disgraced the institution to which they belong. And, since they know that a president in office cannot be arrested on the basis of a warrant issued by an investigating judge, they had therefore knowingly provided to a commando of foreigners the opportunity to violate the rights to the judicial guarantees of Jovenel MOÏSE. This is also an already overwhelming fact in itself, which was aggravated by the murder of the victim.

126. For their part, the team leaders of the USGPN and the Cat Team who were on the spot, as well as the few PNH agents who had retaliated, failed miserably in their mission to protect the president. The USP officer slipped away before the attack and at least one (1) officer undressed before hiding in the backyard of the presidential residence.

127. But, beside those who were on duty that night, it is in fact all the agents who are part of the USP, the USGPN and the Cat Team who have failed. The primary function of six hundred and forty-
seven (647) agents assigned to specialized units was to thwart any plot to assassinate the de facto president. They did not make it.

128. Moreover, the RNDDH points out that the majority of the arrested persons met in the course of this investigation, said they could not be assisted by their lawyer or a witness of their choice. It should be recalled that this is one of the rights to judicial guarantees without the respect of which, important testimonies and confessions can be rejected as long as the persons concerned claim to have been subjected to acts of torture in the investigating office or in the court. However, given the seriousness of the events that occurred on the night of July 6 to 7, 2021, the judicial police should not have made this mistake.

129. In fact, several told the RNDDH that they had been subjected to torture and cruel and inhuman treatment perpetrated against them by agents of the Research and Intervention Brigade (BRI). Once again, the General Inspection of the PNH must intervene, investigate these statements and take the necessary sanctions against the offending agents.

130. Other arrested persons told the RNDDH that it was only after several hearing sessions that they were invited to call upon a lawyer. They were then asked to sign a declaration that their previous confessions were not made under duress. This is a stopgap to hide the seriousness of the DCPJ’s decision to hear people without witnesses. In this sense, the RNDDH recalls that whenever there are addicts to the judicial process, there will always be systematic violations of the rights to judicial guarantees.

131. Similarly, these persons did not appear before a judge who was called upon to determine the legality of their arrest within the prescribed time. However, this is an unavoidable constitutional guarantee that cannot be changed.

132. At this stage, the RNDDH reminds the police and judicial authorities that, regardless of the degree of involvement of the arrested persons, in the preparation and commission of this crime, they must, at all times of the proceedings, benefit from all judicial guarantees.

133. The head of the Prosecutor’s Office of Port-au-Prince, Bed-Ford CLAUDE throughout the investigation of the DCPJ, issued several warrants while the period of flagrante had passed. However, section 30 of the Code of Criminal Investigation specifies that In the case of flagrante delicto, the Commissioner of the Government shall cause to be seized the defendants present, against whom there are serious indications, and, after having questioned them, shall issue the warrant of committal against them. If the accused is not present, the Commissioner of the Government will make an order to have him appear: This order is called a warrant to bring."

134. In behaving this way, Bed-Ford CLAUDE wanted to give the file a color of political persecution.
135. The RNDDH recalls that the fact by people to meet the individuals involved in the assassination of the late Jovenel MOÏSE is not enough for the government commissioner to issue warrants to bring against them. Moreover, it is precisely in order to avoid these excesses that the legislator has added paragraph 3 to article 30 which specifies that “Denunciation alone is not a sufficient presumption to issue this order – the warrant to bring in this case - against an individual with a home.” However, at least one (1) warrant to bring was issued against Farah ALAIN while his name was not even mentioned, by the various people met by the RNDDH.

136. The RNDDH wishes to make it clear to all that the names of Joseph Félix BADIO, Jean Laguel CIVIL, Dimitri HÉRARD, Christian Emmanuel SANON, James SOLAGES and Joseph VINCENT came back to him constantly during the investigation he conducted. Therefore, it is up to them to provide all the information they have for the purposes of the judicial inquiry.

137. The RNDDH acknowledges, however, that the information provided to it did not allow it to lift the veil on the intellectual perpetrators of this assassination because the people met do not seem to want to share all the information they hold. The RNDDH hopes that the processing of the statements, testimonies and confessions of these people to the judicial police and the investigation office will make it possible to identify the intellectual authors without which the real reasons for this assassination will never be known. In this sense, the RNDDH believes that Joseph Félix BADIO as well as the five (5) Colombians who escaped, must constitute the track to prioritize to succeed in identifying the sponsors of this tragic assassination.

138. This case must therefore be the subject of a thorough investigation and for that, it must be transferred to a courageous magistrate, respectful of the laws, principles and procedures and above all, respected in the profession.

139. Finally, the RNDDH recalls that in the victim’s house, large sums of money were found. The Colombians have admitted to having taken some, huge sums were found in the possession of those who were killed and according to other information collected, the five (5) Colombians who escaped, also stole a lot of money. An investigation parallel to the murder of the victim must therefore be conducted by the authorities called to fight corruption, in order to identify the source of these funds.

140. Based on all of these considerations, the NRDDH recommends that police and judicial authorities:

- Identify the intellectual perpetrators of the assassination of the late de facto President Jovenel MOÏSE;
• Respect the rights to judicial guarantees of all individuals indexed in this assassination, at all stages of the procedure;

• Investigate the conditions under which the three (3) Colombian nationals were killed by the National Police of Haiti (PNH) and the denunciations of torture made by those arrested;

• Transfer the case to a courageous, serious Investigating Magistrate Instructor who is able to conduct a meticulous judicial investigation;

• Protect clerks who were involved in the investigation process and are now under threat.