National Human Rights Defense Network (RNDDH)



Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity:

In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation in the Country

April 25, 2025

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A. INTRODUCTION

- 1. On April 25, 2024, the Presidential Transition Council (CPT) took control of the country, promising to restore security, initiate constitutional reform, and conduct elections, with the aim of transferring power to elected authorities by February 7, 2026.
- 2. One year later, what is the status of these commitments?
- 3. The National Human Rights Defense Network (RNDDH), which has been monitoring the actions of the CPT since its inauguration, now intends to share its observations and recommendations with the public.

B. CONTEXT

- 4. For several years, the general situation in Haiti has been marked by the systematic violation of civil, political, social, and economic rights of citizens. Among all the violations, those concerning the right to life, security, private property, and freedom of movement within the national territory directly affect Haitians the most.
- 5. Despite numerous calls to authorities that have successively governed the country, the situation, whic worsened with the takeover of Martissant on June 1, 2021, by armed gangs, escalated further with the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, carried out in the night of July 6-7, 2021.
- 6. In the aftermath of this assassination, political power remained in the hands of Prime Minister Claude Joseph from July 7 to July 20, 2021, before being transferred by the international community to Prime Minister Ariel Henry. The latter spent thirty-three (33) months in power without adopting measures to end the insecurity, impunity, and corruption plaguing the country and the public administration.
- 7.On February 25, 2024, Prime Minister Ariel Henry traveled to Guyana to participate in the 46th regular meeting of the heads of state and government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). While abroad, on February 29, 2024, Ariel Henry went to Kenya to negotiate the deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission (MMAS). On March 1, 2024, a bilateral agreement was signed between Kenya and Haiti. However, the Prime Minister could not return to his country due to the ongoing sociopolitical unrest, as the gangs' coalitions, G-9 an Fanmi e Alye and G-Pèp, united. From February 29 to March 3, 2024, they demonstrated their ability to sow chaos and maintain terror in the Western department, setting it on fire and blood.
- 8. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which had already proposed to help resolve the crisis in Haiti and restore the rule of law, intervened and decided to lead hybrid discussions.

These discussions culminated on March 28, 2024, with the establishment of a nine-member Presidential Transition Council (CPT), seven (7) of whom have voting rights and two (2) are observers. While the discussions were ongoing, on March 11, 2024, in a pre-recorded message, Prime Minister Ariel Henry pledged to hand over power to the CPT while remaining in office to finalize ongoing matters, without being able to return to Haiti.

- 9. While representatives to the CPT were already known for some sectors, others took more time to choose theirs. Some others hesitated, proposed controversial figures, then withdrew them and replaced them with others.
- 10. On April 3, 2024, the discussions led to the political agreement for a peaceful and orderly transition, which constitutes the roadmap for both the CPT and the government to be formed. This agreement, whose vision is "the reconciliation of the State with the Nation, the return to constitutional order, and the defense of Haiti's interests in the new world order," emphasizes, from Section I titled "The Vision and Mission of the Transition," three (3) priorities:
- Security
- Constitutional and institutional reforms
- Elections
- 11. The CPT was installed on April 25, 2024. A first government, led by Garry Conille, was inaugurated on June 12, 2024, but dismissed less than five (5) months later, on November 10, 2024. It was replaced by another government, led by Alix Didier Fils-Aimé.
- 12. An analysis of the current sociopolitical and economic situation, in light of the actions taken by the CPT and the provisions of the political agreement of April 3, 2024, will allow for the assessment of the extent to which the set goals have been achieved.

I. POLITICAL GOVERNANCE

- 13. As provided by Article 2 of the political agreement of April 3, 2024, three (3) governance bodies are foreseen: the Presidential Transition Council (CPT), the government, and the Government Action Control Body (OCAG).
- 14. Two (2) of these bodies have been established. However, no attempt has been made to set up the OCAG, the control body whose constitution strategies and composition are outlined in Articles 9 and 10 of the agreement.
- 15. Thus, the CPT and the government, whose members are appointed by it, solely govern the country, engage the state and its funds, without any possibility of oversight of their actions. Yet, these actions are questionable, particularly those related to the remuneration

of the CPT members and the appointment of general directors, department heads, and vice-heads.

a) Remuneration of the Members of the CPT

16. Subsection 2 titled "Remuneration of the Members of the Presidential Transition Council (CPT)" in the Decree of May 23, 2024, published in the *Le Moniteur* on May 27, 2024, which determines the organization and functioning of the Presidential Transition Council (CPT), specifies in Article 29 that: "The members of the Presidential Transition Council (CPT) shall receive a monthly allowance from the Public Treasury starting from their installation.

The Transition Executive ensures that unjustified privileges are abolished, and that the use of service vehicles, among other things, is rationalized.

The spouse or partner of a member of the Presidential Transition Council (CPT), nor any member of their family, shall manage any public project, own an office, or have access to funds from the Public Treasury."

17. In disregard of these provisions, here is the monthly cost for each member of the CPT:

Description	Amount
Salary	225,000
Operating Expenses (1/3 of salary)	75,000
Second Residence Expenses	400,000
Telephone Card	500,000
Intelligence Expenses	4,500,000
Fuel Expenses	300,000
Debit Card	2,500,000
Spouse Expenses	500,000
Refrigerator Filling Expenses	75,000
Food Expense	925,000
Total	10,000,000 gourdes

18. The CPT also receives monthly expenses for the breakfast and lunch of its members:

Description	Amount in Gourdes
Breakfast and Lunch	3,500,000
Total	3,500,000 gourdes

- 19. Furthermore, the presidential advisors grant themselves special allowances for patronal holidays and other celebrations. For example, during the last Easter holidays, each member of the CPT received between three million (3,000,000) and five million (5,000,000) gourdes.
- 20. Thus, in addition to the special allowances, each month, the members of the CPT cost ninety-three million five hundred thousand (93,500,000) gourdes, which totals one billion one hundred twenty-two million (1,122,000,000) gourdes for the year, siphoned from public funds, allowing them to live lavishly at the state's expense.

b) Coordination of the CPT and Transition Governments

- 21. Since the establishment of the CPT, three (3) coordinators of the structure have succeeded each other in turn, according to a pre-established plan. These are:
 - Edgard LEBLANC FILS
 - Lesly VOLTAIRE
 - Fritz Alphonse JEAN
- 22. It is important to note that this was not the original plan. Indeed, on April 30, 2024, while the population expected elections among the CPT members to designate the Coordinator, an unprecedented agreement was reached between the members, stipulating that four (4) presidents would successively lead the CPT:
 - Edgard LEBLANC FILS
 - Leslie VOLTAIRE
 - Smith AUGUSTIN
 - Louis Gérald GILLES
- 23. However, due to the corruption scandal at BNC, which tarnished the CPT, presidential advisors Smith AUGUSTIN and Louis Gérald GILLES resigned from the coordination role. The rotating presidency is now organized as follows:
 - Edgard LEBLANC FILS: May 7 October 7, 2024
 - Lesly VOLTAIRE: October 7, 2024 March 7, 2025
 - Fritz Alphonse JEAN: March 7 August 7, 2025
 - Laurent SAINT-CYR: August 7, 2025 February 7, 2026
- 24. Furthermore, two (2) governments have succeeded each other. While the first government, led by Garry CONILLE, exited with little to show for having failed to resolve the security issue, the current government is not any better.

c) Selection of Government Members, General Directors, and Departmental Delegates

- 25. The formation of the two (2) governments, as well as the appointments to general management positions and departmental delegations, have turned into a true marketplace, with CPT sectors selling positions to the highest bidders. While it is more complicated to talk about this marketplace within the ministries, the public institutions most affected remain the autonomous public agencies and the departmental delegations. Indeed, in the majority of cases, the individuals appointed to the general management of these agencies, as well as the departmental delegates, possess no competence other than their connections to members of their sector with a representative on the CPT. Therefore, no transparency is required in the recruitment process. Similarly, no local investigation is conducted regarding these individuals appointed to positions of responsibility, despite the country's significant corruption problems and organized crime.
- 26. For example, in February and March 2025, very recently, the CPT and the Prime Minister's office operated a real "sharing of the cake" within the public administration. In this regard:
- **27.** Emmanuel VERTILAIRE, Louis Gérald GILLES, and Smith AUGUSTIN jointly appointed the following:
 - The General Director of the National Airport Authority (AAN)
 - The General Director of the National Education Fund (FNE)
 - The General Director of the National Directorate of Potable Water and Sanitation (DINEPA)
- 28. Lesly VOLTAIRE, for his part, independently chose:
 - The Director of the National Civil Aviation Authority (OFNAC)
 - The General Director of the National Telecommunications Council (CONATEL)
 - The members to be part of the restructuring commission for the National Television of Haiti (TNH)
- 29. Laurent SAINT-CYR appointed the General Director of the National Old Age Insurance Office (ONA), while Fritz Alphonse JEAN selected the Deputy General Director.
- 30. Frinel JOSEPH, a non-voting advisor, appointed the General Director of the Office of Vehicle Insurance Against Third Parties (OAVCT).
- 31. Prime Minister Alix Didier FILS-AIME appointed the General Director of the Economic and Social Assistance Fund (FAES).

32. The posts of departmental delegates and deputy delegates for the districts are also part of the sharing between the CPT and the Prime Minister's office. Thus, the departmental delegations are divided as follows:

• Régine ABRAHAM: Nippes

• Smith AUGUSTIN: Centre

• Alix Didier FILS-AIME: Artibonite

• Louis Gérald GILLES: Grand'Anse

• Fritz Alphonse JEAN: North-East

• Frinel JOSEPH: North-West

Edgard LEBLANC Fils: South-East

• Laurent SAINT-CYR: West

• Emmanuel VERTILAIRE: North

• Leslie VOLTAIRE: South

d) Foreign Trips of CPT Members and the Transition Government

33. In one year, at least fifteen (15) trips were made by CPT members. For each of these trips, a representation fee of five thousand (5,000) US dollars is allocated, and the nightly accommodation is calculated at one thousand (1,000) US dollars. Furthermore, during these trips, the CPT members are typically accompanied by delegations that sometimes consist of up to fifteen (15) people, for whom the air tickets, accommodation, transportation within the visited countries, and meals are also covered by the Haitian government. Below are examples of trips taken by the CPT:

- On July 27, 2024, the then-coordinator of the CPT, Edgard LEBLANC Fils, left the country for a four (4) day trip to Grenada to attend the 47th regular meeting of the heads of state and government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM);
- On September 21, 2024, CPT member Leslie VOLTAIRE went to New York to attend the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA);
- On September 24, 2024, then-coordinator of the CPT, Edgard LEBLANC Fils, joined the delegation in New York to also attend the 79th UNGA session;
- On October 26, 2024, CPT member Leslie VOLTAIRE traveled to Colombia to meet with Colombian President Gustavo PETRO;
- On October 27, 2024, advisor Frinel JOSEPH went to Washington to participate in the works of the Venice Commission under the Organization of American States (OAS), accompanied by members of the National Conference Steering Committee, including former Prime Minister Enex JEAN-CHARLES and Kerlande MIBEL, representative of the Diaspora within the Committee. He returned to Haiti on November 2, 2024;
- On December 5, 2024, advisor Frinel JOSEPH left for Venice, Italy, to attend the 141st plenary session of the European Commission for Democracy through Law, commonly known as the Venice Commission;

- On December 21, 2024, the second coordinator of the CPT, Leslie VOLTAIRE, headed a delegation of several ministers to participate in a joint ministerial council between the Colombian and Haitian governments;
- On January 19, 2025, advisor Fritz Alphonse JEAN left for a mission to Washington, where he met with representatives of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB);
- From January 25 to 31, 2025, CPT coordinator Leslie VOLTAIRE embarked on a European tour, during which he met the Pope at the Vatican and French President Emmanuel MACRON at the Élysée Palace. He also met with French political leaders, including Jean-Luc MÉLENCHON, and with representatives of French civil society, including Jean-Marc AYRAULT. Upon his return, he told the press that he had asked Notre-Dame du Perpétuel Secours for help in miraculously combating armed gangs;
- On February 18, 2025, advisor Laurent SAINT-CYR left to attend the 48th conference of heads of state and government of CARICOM, held in Barbados;
- On February 24, 2025, advisor Smith AUGUSTIN went to the United States to participate in the 16th Annual Leadership Summit organized by the National Haitian American Elected Officials Network (NHAEON) in Miami;
- On March 9, 2025, advisor Frinel JOSEPH and members of the Electoral Council (CEP) went to Peru and Mexico for an official tour, where they held meetings with the National Electoral Processes Office (ONPE) of Peru and the National Electoral Institute (INE) of Mexico;
- On March 25, 2025, current CPT coordinator Fritz Alphonse JEAN went to Jamaica to meet with U.S. Secretary of State Marco RUBIO to discuss the security situation in Haiti;
- On April 7, 2025, advisor Leslie VOLTAIRE left for Honduras to participate in the 9th Summit of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC);
- On April 8, 2025, advisor Smith AUGUSTIN, accompanied by a delegation of at least fifteen (15) members, went to the United States. Not having been invited anywhere, he did not announce his trip to inform the public about the purpose of his departure. However, upon arriving in the United States, he organized several dinners, lived in a lavish manner, and eventually met with the outgoing Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS) and some members of the Haitian Diaspora. Upon his return, on April 18, 2025, he did not provide any report of his ten (10) day trip.
- 34. The transition government led by Garry CONILLE, established on June 12, 2024, and dismissed on November 10, 2024, made at least three (3) trips in less than five (5) months:
 - On June 28, 2024, two (2) weeks after his inauguration, Prime Minister Garry CONILLE left for Washington and New York to mobilize international financial institutions on the situation in Haiti. He was accompanied by the Minister of Economy and Finance, Marie Kethleen FLORESTAL, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dominique DUPUY, and his chief of staff, Nesmy MANIGAT. He returned to Haiti on July 6, 2024;

- From September 20 to 29, 2024, Garry CONILLE went to New York at the head of an important delegation, including journalists, supporters, political activists, and close allies, to attend the 79th regular session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). He took the opportunity to hold bilateral meetings with heads of state and government;
- On October 5, 2024, Garry CONILLE left for Kenya and the United Arab Emirates to meet with Kenyan President William RUTO regarding the Multinational Security Support Mission (MMAS) and to discuss new technologies and technical assistance in the security field with the authorities in the United Arab Emirates. He returned to Haiti on October 15, 2024.

e) Establishment of the OCAG

35. According to Article 9 of the political agreement of April 3, 2024, the Executive Control Body (OCAG) must be established and constituted following extensive consultations conducted by the CPT with civil society organizations based in Haiti and in the diaspora. It is composed of fifteen (15) members and its main mission – as its name indicates – is to control government action and ensure the transparency promised in the management of state affairs.

36. Since the OCAG has never been established, the CPT therefore governs the country alone, engaging the state and public funds without any possibility of verifying its actions.

In one year, the CPT has not fulfilled any of its commitments regarding political governance. Of the three (3) bodies, the most important one, the OCAG, has not been established. This body could have prevented a number of scandals for the transitional authorities.

Public finances have not been cleaned up. On the contrary, since its inauguration, the CPT has systematically drained the state's coffers by granting itself exorbitant resources and encouraging its members to appoint individuals to positions of responsibility who have not undergone any form of certification.

The government, led by Alix Didier FILS-AIME, has not fared any better. It has agreed to enter, along with the CPT, into the practice of trading positions when it comes to appointing members to the public administration, without regard for the abilities and qualifications of those who are actually appointed. Even worse, the government seems completely unaffected by the absence of the OCAG.

Numerous trips at the state's expense have been made by both the members of the CPT and the government led by Garry CONILLE. These costly trips have brought nothing concrete to the country but have instead perpetuated this practice of plundering the state's coffers.

Thus, political governance has been characterized, for the past year, by the systematic waste of public funds and a true "sharing of the cake" between the CPT and the Prime Minister's office.

II. On the Restoration of Security

- 37. According to Article 20 of the political agreement of April 3, 2024, "The fundamental mission of the government, equipped with a roadmap agreed upon by the stakeholders, is to:
 - Restore public security conditions and define, with international partners, the conditions for effective support to the Haitian security forces, while respecting national sovereignty.
 - Create a Justice, Truth, and Reparation Commission..."
- 38. However, during the analyzed period, acts that endanger the lives and property of the population have been numerous, while government actions have been far fewer.

a) Massacres and Armed Attacks Recorded Under the CPT

39. Since the installation of the Presidential Transition Council (CPT) on April 25, 2024, at least thirteen (13) massacres and armed attacks have been recorded in the country. These include:

- Gressier and Carrefour, May 2024
- Gros Morne, June 2024
- Ganthier, July 2024
- Cité Soleil, September 2024
- Pont Sondé, October 2024
- Arcahaie, October 2024
- Solino, October-November 2024
- Wharf Jérémie, December 2024
- Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite, December 2024
- Kenscoff, January 2025
- Chateaublond, February 2025
- Carrefour-Feuilles, March 11-12, 2025
- Mirebalais / Saut d'eau, March 30, 2025
- 40. The human and material losses recorded during these episodes of violence are immense. Here are a few examples:
- 41. Carrefour and Gressier¹: These two (2) neighboring communes have been controlled by armed gangs for several years. However, since June 1, 2021, the situation worsened with the armed attack recorded at Martissant. Several armed gangs control the Martissant Carrefour route: The Village de Dieu gang led by Johnson ANDRE, alias Izo 5 Segond, the Grand Ravine Baz Kaporal Lapli gang led by Renel DESTINA, alias Ti Lapli, and the gang led by Christ-Roi CHERY, alias Krisla. Since February 2024, the Carrefour Gressier route has been controlled by Beliose LOUIS JEUNE, alias Bout Ba, and Charlemagne DORIN, alias Ti Bebe, himself the leader of the 103 Zonbi gang operating in Gressier. The toll from the various raids carried out in these two (2) communes is as follows: at least sixty-six (66) people have been killed or gone missing, and forty-six (46) women and girls have been victims of sexual violence. Hundreds of houses have been looted, burned, or occupied by armed bandits. Several vehicles and many goods havebeen stolen by these gangs.
- 42.**Pont-Sondé**²: From October 2 to 3, 2024, members of the Gran Grif gang, led by gang leader Luckson ELAN, invade Pont Sondé, the 5th communal section of Saint-Marc, in the

¹ Assassinations, Rapes, Looting, and Arson in Carrefour and Gressier Under the Indifferent Gaze of the New State Authorities, August 15, 2024, 22 pages https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/6-Rap-Carrefour-Gressier-15Aout2024.FR .pdf

² Massacre at Pont-Sondé: The RNDDH Demands Immediate Protection of the Haitian Population from the State Authorities, October 4, 2024, 4 pages https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/2-CP-Pont-Sonde-04Octobre2024.FR_.pdf

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Artibonite department, with the help of Ti Pay, an individual from the attacked community, who is also a member of the attacking armed gang. At least seventy (70) people are killed, and twenty-three (23) others are wounded by gunshots or during their escape attempt. Several houses are set on fire by the bandits. The population, forced to flee, seeks refuge with relatives or in the public square Philippe Guerrier in Saint-Marc.

- 43. **Wharf Jérémie**³: On December 6 and 7, 2024, in Wharf Jérémie, at least one hundred and ten (110) people are killed by gang leader Monel FELIX, also known as Micanor ALTES, alias Roi Micanor, due to the illness and subsequent death of his son Benson ALTES. In fact, Father Micanor ALTES consults a hougan who tells him that his son's illness is supernatural and that, in order to save him, the werewolves in the area responsible for the illness must be killed. On December 6, 2024, he invites sixty (60) elderly people to a meeting through members of his armed gang. When they arrive at the designated location, he has them all killed. The following day, his son dies. He then kills another seventy (70) people, of all ages.
- 44. **Kenscoff**⁴: On January 27, 28, and 29, 2025, armed bandits from the terrorist coalition Viv Ansanm carry out a bloody and coordinated attack in several localities of the commune of Kenscoff. The attack is facilitated by a prison escapee, Pierre Fils ORVIL, originally from Kenscoff, who acts as a guide for the armed bandits led by Didi, an ally of the armed gang of Village de Dieu, led by Johnson ANDRE, alias Izo 5 Segond. At least one hundred and thirtynine (139) people are killed or go missing. At least forty-three (43) houses are vandalized and/or set on fire by the armed bandits.
- 45. **Chateaublond**⁵: On February 16, 2025, in Chateaublond, Frères, in the commune of Pétion-Ville, the armed gang Kraze Baryè, led by Vitelhomme INNOCENT, attacks the population to avenge Annil JEAN-PHILIPPE, alias Tinonm, who was killed during a police intervention on February 14 or 15, 2025. Stanley JEAN-PHILIPPE, one of the two (2) sons of Annil JEAN-PHILIPPE, alias Tinonm, obtains permission from Vitelhomme INNOCENT to avenge his father. On February 16, 2025, during a punitive expedition, twenty (20) people are killed, a ten (10)-year-old girl is raped, and several houses and vehicles are set on fire.
- 46. **Mirebalais/Saut-d'Eau**⁶: On the night of March 30 to 31, 2025, between 2:00 AM and 3:00 AM, armed bandits invade Mirebalais. The police officers stationed at the Commissariat

 $\frac{https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/2-Rap-Wharf-Jeremie-Kenscoff-Chateaublond-28 Fev 2025.pdf}{}$

5 Idem

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³ Massacres at Wharf Jérémie, Kenscoff, and Chateaublond: The Transitional Government Continues with the Policy of Devaluation of Life Implemented for Several Years by State Authorities, February 28, 2025, 26 pages

⁴ Idem

⁶ Fall of Two Communes in the Centre Department into the Hands of Armed Bandits: The Transitional Authorities Worsen the Country's Security Situation, April 10, 2025, 7 pages

and the Civil Prison of the city flee. The armed bandits take advantage of this to set both the Commissariat and the Prison on fire, after facilitating the escape of all prisoners, except one who they execute themselves. Continuing with their plan, on April 3, 2025, these armed bandits enter Saut-d'Eau, where they demolish the city's Commissariat and cause numerous human and material losses.

47. The toll of losses recorded in Mirebalais and Saut-d'Eau is enormous: at least twenty (20) members of the population are killed, including one (1) police officer. At least three (3) people are missing, including two (2) journalists. Sixty (60) others are killed in exchanges of gunfire with law enforcement. According to local authorities and some residents, these individuals are bandits and prison escapees.

48.In all these newly lost territories under the transition, the situation of tension is palpable. Gang leaders organize life in these areas and continually extort money from those who still frequent these neighborhoods. Moreover, daily raids are recorded in these areas, exacerbating the situation and increasing the number of victims.

b) Other Acts Endangering the Lives and Property of the Population

49. In addition to the mass crimes committed during the analyzed period, other acts endangering the lives and property of the population, including gender-based and sexual violence, are also recorded. Indeed, the combined information gathered by the CE-JILAP and the RNDDH shows that from April 2024 to March 2025, four thousand four hundred five (4,405) people were murdered, among them, at least eight hundred five (805) people during the period from January to March 2025 alone.

50. Furthermore, for the analyzed period, at least three thousand seven hundred ninety-two (3,792) women were victims of sexual and gender-based violence, according to the combined data from the RNDDH, Nègès Mawon⁷, and the Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn (SOFA)⁸, including one thousand eight hundred thirty-seven (1,837) cases of sexual violence, seven hundred ninety-four (794) cases of physical violence, and one thousand one hundred thirty-two (1,132) cases of economic violence.

 $\frac{https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/3-RapM.-Attaques-armees-Mirebalais-Saut-d\ Eau-10Avril2025.FR\ .pdf$

⁷ Nègès Mawon - Women's, Girls', and Sexual Minorities' Rights in Haiti: Report on Recorded Violence from January to October 2024, November 2024

⁸ SOFA - 2024 Report on Violence Against Women, January 2025

51. Meanwhile, thirty-one (31) officers of the National Police of Haiti (PNH), eight (8) soldiers from the Haitian Armed Forces, and two (2) agents of the Multinational Security Support Mission (MMAS) have been killed since the inauguration of the CPT, from April 25, 2024, to date.

c) Establishment of the National Security Council (CNS)

- 52. Articles 25, 26, and 27 of the political agreement of April 3, 2024, address the establishment of the National Security Council (CNS), its composition, its mission, and its coordination and consultation work in order to provide an adequate response to the various aspects of the country's security crisis. However, this council has never been established. On the contrary, many measures have been adopted by the CPT and the government, which seem to act only out of amateurism. Here are a few of them:
- 53. State of Emergency for Security: Since July 2024, the transitional government has regularly declared a state of emergency for specific periods, always with the possibility of renewal. While the first measures concerned specific areas, gradually, new communes have been included as territory losses have been recorded. Most recently, on April 7, 2025, a security state of emergency was declared for the entire country for a period of one (1) month.
- 54. Propaganda Surrounding the Adoption of a War Budget: The CPT and the government have been promising for months to adopt a war budget. However, to date, police and military equipment and materials have never been delivered to either the National Police of Haiti (PNH) or the Haitian Armed Forces (FAD'H), despite consultations held with both the senior command of the PNH and that of the Armed Forces regarding the establishment of this budget.
- 55. Use of Kamikaze Drones Against the Bandits: On March 1, 2025, the population learns through a message on X, from the verified personal account of Prime Minister Alix Didier FILS-AIME, that a Task Force has been created by the Prime Minister's office and the CPT and is already in full operation. Sometime later, the population will learn that this operation is being carried out with Kamikaze drones, actually piloted by the Prime Minister's office, with no involvement from the police institution, the Armed Forces, or even the MMAS.
- 56. Adoption of a Resolution Integrating the BSAP in the Fight Against Insecurity: On April 2, 2025, the CPT adopts a resolution published on April 3, 2025, in the official journal of the country, stating that BSAP agents will be integrated, after certification, into a system allowing them to be used in the fight for the restoration of security. The BSAP is actually a paramilitary body established by Jeantel JOSEPH, who was then the General Director of the National Protected Areas Agency (ANAP), with the goal of participating in the preservation of protected areas. However, since its creation, many BSAP agents have been linked to human rights violations, and they have never done anything to fight environmental degradation.

For the restoration of security, the cosmetic measures adopted by the CPT and the transitional government have been ineffective. Thirteen (13) massacres and armed attacks have been carried out under the transition, not including other cases of assassinations, armed robberies, rapes, etc. that have been recorded. Added to this, the expansion of armed bandits and their control over new territories clearly shows, if any further proof was needed, that the CPT and its government have no security plan.

The National Security Council (CNS), which could have been a body facilitating the development and implementation of a national security plan, has never been established. In the meantime, the CPT and the Prime Minister's office on one side, and the Superior Council of the National Police (CSPN) on the other, have fueled, throughout the analyzed period, rumors of internal conflicts without being able to fulfill their promises to restore order and security in the country in general, and particularly in the Western department.

III. On Justice and the Rule of Law

- 57. Article 37 of the political agreement of April 3, 2024, addresses the measures to be adopted by the transitional government to improve the effectiveness of justice by ensuring the regular functioning of judicial bodies, strengthening the execution and implementation of the government's criminal policy, enhancing legal assistance, and facilitating access to justice.
- 58. The response of the Haitian judicial system to the mass crimes recorded during this transitional government, as well as to complaints related to previous massacres and armed attacks, draws the attention of the RNDDH.
- 59. The thirteen (13) massacres and armed attacks mentioned above, committed during the current transition, have been publicly denounced. Some videos have gone viral on social media, including those of the Wharf Jérémie massacre, the Kenscoff massacre, the Chateaublond massacre, and the Mirebalais / Saut d'Eau massacre.
- 60. Only for the case of the Wharf Jérémie massacre has public action been initiated by the government commissioner near the Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance, Frantz MONCLAIR, against Micanor ALTES, alias Roi Micanor, the instigator of this carnage. The case, transmitted on January 29, 2025, to the registry of the Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance, numbered 0210 24-25, was assigned to the Instruction Chamber of Magistrate Marthel JEAN CLAUDE.

- 61. The other episodes of violence have, to date, not been subject to any judicial proceedings. For example, on October 9, 2024, thirty-eight (38) victims and survivors of the Carrefour and Gressier massacres filed complaints against their attackers. The case numbered 768-10/24 was assigned to Judge Marie Claudel PIERRE. To date, no known investigative action has been carried out.
- 62. Similarly, cases of previous massacres transmitted to the justice system by hundreds of victims who have filed complaints against their attackers have not progressed. For example:
 - On May 22, 2023, one hundred thirteen (113) victims of the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac massacre, perpetrated between April 24 and May 6, 2022, filed complaints. The case numbered 0100/2023, assigned to Magistrate André SAINT-ISERT, has not shown any progress to date;
 - On May 23, 2023, one hundred fifty-eight (158) victims of the Cité Soleil massacre, committed between July 7 and 17, 2022, filed complaints. The case numbered 194-05/23 was forwarded to Magistrate Johnson SIMON's office. No progress has been recorded;
 - On September 15, 2023, seventy-eight (78) victims of the Carrefour-Feuilles massacre, carried out from September 4 to 12, 2023, filed complaints. The case numbered 419-09/23 in the registry of the Instruction Chamber, assigned to Magistrate Johnson SIMON, has shown no progress to date.
- 63. Currently, only the La Saline massacre has a closure order, issued on June 20, 2024, by Magistrate Jean Wilner MORIN, six (6) years after this massacre, which occurred on November 13 and 14, 2018, and led to multiple violations: at least seventy-one (71) people were killed and at least twenty-two (22) women were collectively raped.
- 64. Additionally, during the 2023-2024 judicial year, criminal sessions⁹ were held in fifteen (15) of the country's Court of First Instance jurisdictions. Only two hundred forty-one (241) people were judged. These hearings had no impact on the prison population.
- 65. At the beginning of the 2024-2025 judicial year, many promises were made by judicial heads to intensify correctional and criminal hearings. However, only a few rare criminal hearings have taken place to date in some jurisdictions, such as those in Aquin, Cap-Haïtien, Les Coteaux, Croix-des-Bouquets, Fort-Liberté, Mirebalais, and Petit-Goâve. These hearings were not scheduled based on the number of pending cases, so they have had no impact on the legal situation of the prison population. Indeed, as of April 24, 2025, the Haitian prison population is estimated at seven thousand one hundred twenty-eight (7,128) prisoners, of

⁹ Judicial System and Detention Centers in Haiti: A Weakened Justice, Invisible Results, and the Systematic Violation of Detainees' Judicial Guarantees, November 7, 2024, 41 Pages https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/7-Rap-Justice-2023-2024-Prisons-07Nov2024.FR_.pdf

whom one thousand two hundred sixty-seven (1,271) are convicted, and five thousand eight hundred fifty-seven (5,857), or 82.17%, are awaiting trial.

66. Meanwhile, due to the abandonment of certain prisons and the armed attacks suffered by others, five (5) correctional centers in the Western department have been emptied of their populations. The Center for the Rehabilitation of Minors in Conflict with the Law (CERMICOL) has since been transformed into a penitentiary complex. Outside of regulations, women, men, boys, and girls are incarcerated in close quarters, in unsanitary conditions, and in total disregard of detention security rules.

a) Formation of the Justice, Truth, and Reparation Commission

67. On September 18, 2024, the Justice, Truth, and Reparation Commission was established, in line with Article 20 of the political agreement of April 3, 2024. According to Article 40 of the said agreement, its mandate is to "provide the Justice system and the Executive with the necessary elements to act and shed light on the blood crimes, financial crimes, numerous massacres, and multiple collective rapes committed in the country over the past years."

68. However, made up of 43% of its members from influential figures of the Haitian Tèt Kale Party (PHTK)¹⁰, the commission has, since its public presentation, been considered stillborn. Indeed, the atrocities attributed to the authorities who have successively governed the country were committed under the PHTK regime. Some argue that the commission, as currently constituted, will not be able to effectively establish the truth of the events, knowing that high-ranking officials of the PHTK are implicated in their planning and execution.

b) Creation of Two Specialized Judicial Units

69. Two (2) specialized judicial units were created, focusing respectively on financial crimes and organized crime, mass crimes, and sexual violence. These units, for which a decree was adopted on April 14, 2025, by the Council of Ministers, and published on April 16, 2025, in the official journal *Le Moniteur*, are intended to strengthen the government's criminal policy regarding corruption, financial crimes, massacres, and sexual violence, and to provide many victims of massacres and armed attacks in the country, particularly women and girls who are victims of sexual violence, with access to justice.

¹⁰ Nou Pap Dòmi, POHDH, and RNDDH Denounce the Creation of the Truth, Justice, and Reparation Commission, October 2, 2024, 4 Pages https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/1-Note-CVJR-NPD-OHDH-RNDDH-02Octobre2024.pdf

70. Recommendations made by five (5) civil society¹¹ organizations and communicated to the relevant authorities have been partially taken into account. However, those concerning the independence of these units from the heads of the Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance and regarding the non-granting of immunity protection to high-ranking state officials involved in the organization and perpetration of these crimes were not accepted.

c) Relocation of the Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance

71. On March 31, 2025, the transitional government formally inaugurated the new location of the Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance. Members of the CPT, Prime Minister Alix Didier FILS-AIME, and several ministers participated in the ceremony.

72. The decision to relocate the Prosecutor's Office and the Court to Delmas 75 was justified by the armed attacks recorded in the areas surrounding Lalue, where they were previously located. However, the new location is actually a family home situated in a residential neighborhood, rented by the Haitian state from a private individual. The building, completely empty at the inauguration, has only recently begun to be outfitted. In fact, it was not until April 24, 2025, nearly a month after the inauguration, that an office supply shipment was delivered to the Court, which is still not provided with electricity. The Court also lacks computer equipment, fans, or air conditioning. The rooms are not separated, and no space has been set up for detainees. The registry office is, in turn, exceedingly cramped. As for the Prosecutor's Office, it is even more poorly equipped. The door to its registry is made of wood, without any adequate measures for the security of files and evidence.

73. It is worth noting that during initial discussions, the location was visited by magistrates who stated that it did not meet their expectations. A four (4)-member commission was formed by the Superior Council of the Judiciary (CSPJ). This commission concluded in a report sent to the Minister of Justice, Dr. Patrick PELISSIER, that the space was not suitable for housing the court. A meeting was later held with the CSPJ, during which the minister claimed the space was rented to house the specialized judicial units. However, to the general surprise, and disregarding the conclusions of the CSPJ-formed commission, the Minister of Justice ordered that the Court and Prosecutor's Office be housed in this building for a period of nine (9) months.

 $\frac{\text{https://ecc-haiti.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Projet-de-decret-sur-les-Poles-judiciaires-specialises-Observations-des-OSC.pdf}{}$

 $^{^{11}}$ Observations from Haitian Civil Society Organizations on the Draft Decree for the Creation of Two Specialized Judicial Units, March 20, 2025, 10 Pages

IV. Fundamental Freedoms

a) Demonstrations Denouncing Insecurity

74. In response to the intensification of acts of violence and the advance of armed bandits,

Complaints Filed by Victims and Relatives of Victims of Several Massacres and Armed Attacks Have Not Moved in the Justice System

Complaints filed by victims and relatives of victims of several massacres and armed attacks have not progressed within the Justice system. Of the thirteen (13) episodes of violence recorded during the analyzed period, only for the atypical massacre of Wharf Jérémie has public action been initiated by the government commissioner of Port-au-Prince.

The performance of the Haitian judicial system, both for the 2023-2024 judicial year and for the ongoing 2024-2025 year, does not provide confidence in the strategies put in place by the transitional government to reduce the rate of illegal and arbitrary pretrial detention. Despite the spectacular escapes recorded, more than 82% of the prison population is still awaiting trial. Furthermore, the general conditions of detention have worsened under the CPT, notably with CERMICOL being converted into a penitentiary complex. The recent relocation of the Prosecutor's Office and the Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance to a house rented from a private individual in Delmas 75 proves that the Justice system continues to struggle in the face of armed gangs. Today, the conditions under which the judicial staff involved in this relocation work, as well as the conditions in which litigants are received, show that the premises are not yet ready to be operational. However, beyond this issue of inadequate premises, there is also the problem of dozens of

since March 2025, citizens have decided to demand results from the CPT regarding the restoration of minimum security conditions in the country in general and in the Western department in particular.

75. Several demonstrations have taken place, attracting thousands of citizens who denounce insecurity and demand that the Haitian state regain control of neighborhoods under the control of armed gangs, to enable families to return to their areas of residence. All demonstrations have been violently repressed, under the pretext that protesters should not approach the Villa d'Accueil. In this context, tear gas has been used excessively by the police, who also fire at head height toward protesters, using both lethal and non-lethal bullets. For example:

• During the March 19, 2025 demonstration, around ten (10) people were shot and injured. One of them, Idovic ELIBERT, a member of the Canapé-vert self-defense brigade, succumbed to his injuries.

- During the April 2, 2025 demonstration, the vehicle used for sound equipment was seized by the police, who returned it a few days later after vandalizing it. According to the vehicle's owners, it was returned with the following list of missing items:
 - o One (1) sound mixer / charger
 - o One (1) DJ equipment
 - o Two (2) microphones
 - o One (1) sound output cable
 - o One (1) USB cable
 - Laptop charger
 - o The ID of a citizen who was also in the vehicle.

b) Attacks on the Media

76. During the first year of the CPT, press freedom was not guaranteed. Armed attacks were carried out against Haitian media. At least six (6) radio and/or television stations were set on fire by armed bandits from the terrorist coalition Viv Ansanm, and at least one (1) other radio station was renamed and taken over by them. These included:

- Radio Souffle Divin, Cayes, whose premises were vandalized on the night of May 23 to 24, 2024;
- Radiotélévision Caraïbes (RTVC), Rue Chavannes, Port-au-Prince, whose premises were set on fire on the night of March 12 to 13, 2025, after being looted by armed bandits;
- Radio Transparence F.M., downtown Saut-d'Eau, set on fire on April 2, 2025;
- Radio Mélodie F.M., Rue Capois, Port-au-Prince, vandalized on the night of March 12 to 13, 2025;
- Storm TV, Delmas 19, set on fire on the night of April 14 to 15, 2025;
- Télé Pluriel, Delmas 19, whose premises were set on fire on the night of March 15 to 16, 2025.

77. Additionally, on April 20, 2025, bandits broke into the premises of Radio Panic F.M., located in downtown Mirebalais. They renamed it Radio Taliban F.M. and broadcast their own programs for some time.

78. Journalists were also victims during the period covered by this report. For example:

• On December 24, 2024, two (2) journalists were killed, and seven (7) others were injured at the State University of Haiti (HUEH)¹² Hospital, where they had been

 12 Increase in Armed Attacks Against the Haitian Press: The RNDDH Reminds the Transitional Authorities of Their Promise for Security, RNDDH - Com.P/A2025/No3, 2 Pages $\frac{\text{https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/3-CP-RNDDH-Attaques-contre-des-medias-17Mars2025.FR_pdf}$

Poor Governance, Insecurity, Corruption, and Impunity: In One Year, the CPT Has Worsened the Already Concerning Situation of the Country RNDDH-Report/A25/No4-VF

- invited to cover the reopening ceremony of the HUEH, organized by the then-Minister of Public Health and Population, Dr. Duckenson Lorthe BLEMA.
- On March 31, 2025, journalist and owner of RC F.M. Roger Claudy ISRAEL and his brother Marco ISRAËL were kidnapped by armed bandits during the Mirebalais massacre. They were released on April 17, 2025.
- 79. It should be noted that other journalists have also been targeted by armed bandits, who have threatened them in messages spread via social media.

The violent repression of demonstrations demanding the restoration of minimum security conditions in the country, armed attacks targeting Haitian journalists, the looting and/or repeated burning of media premises, are the warning signs of a totalitarian regime that jeopardizes fundamental freedoms.

V. Struggles Against Corruption and Smuggling

80. According to the wish expressed in Article 38 of the political agreement of April 3, 2024, the capacities of public institutions to fight corruption must be strengthened by the transitional authorities. Civil society organizations engaged in this fight should be supported, transparency should be established, and the right to access information should be respected.

a) Handling of the BNC Scandal

81. Alongside the "sharing of the cake" strategy used to recruit personnel for the public administration, the huge corruption scandal at the BNC (Bank of the Republic of Haiti) led to the indictment of three (3) presidential advisers—Smith AUGUSTIN, Louis Gérald GILLES, and Emmanuel VERTILAIRE—for serious abuse of power, solicitation of bribes, and passive corruption. The handling of this case by the judiciary, as well as the behavior of the CPT, reveals the evident lack of willingness on the part of this body to respect its commitments to fight corruption.

82. Furthermore, it was through the BNC scandal that Haitian society learned that the presidential advisers considered the funds allocated for intelligence as personal allowances. They divide the available amount among themselves, each receiving five million (5,000,000)

Fall of Two Communes in the Centre Department into the Hands of Armed Bandits: The Transitional Authorities Worsen the Country's Security Situation, April 10, 2025, 7 Pages https://web.rnddh.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/3-RapM.-Attaques-armees-Mirebalais-Sautd-Eau-10Avril2025.FR_.pdf

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gourdes per month. Despite numerous calls from Haitian society in general, and civil society organizations in particular, urging them to renounce this amount, nothing has changed.

b) The Scandal of the PNH Recruitment Market

- 83. Another case of corruption that illustrates government action is the case related to the market PNHOO-2425-TF-AOON-S-1/01/11, aimed at recruiting agents for the Haitian National Police (PNH). In October 2024, bidding contractors denounced suspicions of influence peddling, nepotism, and large-scale corruption in the awarding of eight (8) of the eleven (11) lots of the PNH recruitment market to companies likely owned by one individual.
- 84. At the request of civil society organizations, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security established an ad hoc commission to evaluate the market. On December 27, 2024, the commission submitted a damning report to the Minister, confirming that irregularities and inconsistencies in the bids and pricing strategies were indeed identified.
- 85. On January 28, 2025, during an initial meeting with civil society organizations that had alerted the Ministry to the protesting bidders, the Minister of Justice and Public Security, Dr. Patrick PELISSIER, acknowledged that the report submitted to him by the commission in December 2024 was damning. On April 14, 2025, a meeting was finally held with the protestors. During this meeting, they demanded respect for the law and the resumption of the market in question.
- 86. The next day, on April 15, 2025, in a final attempt to legitimize the corrupt actions carried out in awarding the contested market, three (3) of the nine (9) protestors—Le Romarin Service Traiteur, M&M Création, and Délices à la Carte—received correspondence from the Minister of Justice, informing them that they had been allocated a lot for which the contract would be signed with the Ministry.
- 87. Thus, in a market contested for corruption, the transitional government again attempts to corrupt the protestors instead of complying with the law and restarting the process, which is flawed from the outset.

c) Fight Against Smuggling

- 88. According to the wish expressed in Article 42 of the political agreement of April 3, 2024, the government commits to increasing the effectiveness of resources and vigorously fighting against smuggling in order to strengthen the financial autonomy of the state.
- 89. To date, the only decision that seems to have been taken to reduce smuggling is the ban on containers from the United States that transit through the Dominican Republic from entering Haitian territory. However, while resources have indeed increased due to this decision, they only benefit the members of the CPT and the transitional government.

By protecting the presidential advisers indicted in the BNC corruption scandal for abuse of power, bribery solicitation, and passive corruption, by continuing to launder state funds, allocating the amounts designated for intelligence and information as personal expenses, and by deciding not to comply with the law in order to resume the flawed and corrupt process that led to the fraudulent awarding of the PNH restoration contract, the CPT and the transitional government have shown themselves to be incapable of fulfilling the great promise made to Haitian society to clean up public finances, to steer the country toward transparency, and to fight corruption within the public administration.

Similarly, the results of the fight against smuggling are neither effective nor convincing.

VI. On Constitutional Reform

90. According to Articles 28 and following of the political agreement of April 3, 2024, initiatives have been undertaken by the CPT with the aim of carrying out constitutional reform. In this regard:

- On June 25, 2024, the CPT launched the work related to constitutional reform and the national conference:
- On July 17, 2024, the decree creating the working group on the constitution was published. It is coordinated by former deputy Jerry TARDIEU and is composed of eight (8) other members:
 - o Professor Jean-Robert CHARLES,
 - Master Enex JEAN-CHARLES, former Prime Minister, president of the Steering Committee of the National Conference,
 - Magistrate Norah Amilcar JEAN-FRANÇOIS,
 - Master Guerdy LISSADE,
 - Specialist in economic inclusion Kerlande MIBEL,
 - Dr. Louis Naud PIERRE, former executive secretary of the General States of the Nation (EGSN),
 - Master Eugène PIERRE-LOUIS, Dean of the Faculty of Law and Economic Sciences of Port-au-Prince,
 - Master Patrick PIERRE-LOUIS, President of the Bar Association of Port-au-Prince.
- On August 23, 2024, the steering committee of the national conference was installed. This committee is led by former Prime Minister Enex JEAN-CHARLES and is responsible for leading consultations that will result in the revision of the country's constitution.
- On October 18, 2024, the CPT proceeded with the partial installation of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), whose mission is to organize the constitutional referendum.

- 91. Parallel to all these actions by the transitional government, several civil society organizations have raised their voices to denounce the opacity in which the committee responsible for revising the Constitution of the country is working. This concern has not been addressed. A first referendum date was set for May 11, 2025. However, due to the accelerated deterioration of the country's security situation, the said committee has postponed the referendum to a later date.
- 92. Two (2) main issues are being reproached to those working on the revision of the Constitution and the organization of the referendum. First, the amended Haitian Constitution, in its Article 284-3, specifies that "Any popular consultation aimed at amending the Constitution through referendum is formally prohibited." Moreover, this Constitution is a true declaration of rights. The population believes that, in order to make an informed choice, it must be able to compare the two (2) texts. However, no workshop for presenting the new constitutional text has been held to date.

The constitutional reform initiated by the transitional government, under the aegis of the CPT, risks leading to a huge sociopolitical crisis, as it is being carried out in complete opacity.

VII. On the Organization of Elections

- 93. Section XI of the political agreement of April 3, 2024, addresses the issue of elections, covering the structure and composition of the electoral body, constitutional revision, and the organization of the electoral contests themselves.
- 94. In this regard, the CPT launched, on July 12, 2024, the process aimed at forming the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP). Correspondence was sent to various sectors of the country to select a representative, in accordance with the decree of May 27, 2024.
- 95. This process was manipulated from the outset by the presidential adviser Frinel JOSEPH and criticized by several sectors, which denounced the lack of transparency in the strategies that led to the selection of certain representatives. This did not lead the CPT to reconsider its actions. On the contrary, despite these alerts, on September 18, 2024, by presidential decree, seven (7) of the nine (9) members of the CEP were appointed. These were:
 - Schnaida ADELY, representative of the Vodou Communities;
 - Jacques DESROSIERS, representative of the Journalists' Associations;
 - Jaccéus JOSEPH, representative of the Farmers' Associations;
 - Marie Florence MATHIEU, representative of the University;
 - Peterson PIERRE-LOUIS, representative of the Reformed Churches;
 - Patrick SAINT-HILAIRE, representative of the Haitian Episcopal Conference;
 - Nemrod SANON, representative of the Union sector.

- 96. The CEP, reduced by two (2) members, was installed on October 18, 2024. It was not completed until December 13, 2024, by the appointments of Yves Marie EDOUARD and Rose Thérèse Magalie GEORGES, representing the women's sector and human rights, respectively.
- 97. From January 11 to 16, 2025, the CEP launched the recruitment process for the members of the Departmental Referendum Offices (BRD) and the Communal Referendum Offices (BRC). Examinations were held on January 19, 2025, and the results for the Western department were published on March 13, 2025.
- 98. On February 3, 2025, the new Executive Director of the CEP, Philippe AUGUSTIN, was appointed and then installed on February 4, 2025, in the CEP's own premises. This was followed by a series of meetings with members of civil society, political parties, etc., aimed at restoring the credibility of the electoral process, informing about the ongoing work at the CEP, and gathering recommendations.

Established amidst a crisis, the CEP is likely to face significant difficulties in conducting the elections. Moreover, society at large is demanding a tangible improvement in the country's security situation, with the goal of preventing armed bandits and their accomplices from taking power through violence on election day.

VIII. On Institutional Recovery and Economic Revival

- 99. Section XIII of the political agreement of April 3, 2024, addresses institutional and economic recovery. In this regard, while considering the transitional nature of the government, the agreement advocates reforms in the judicial system, public administration, and revenues. It underscores the importance of fighting corruption and impunity and prioritizes economic revival, environmental cleanup, and the rehabilitation of infrastructure. However, the findings remain alarming.
- 100. School infrastructures in several communes of the Western department are occupied by people who have fled for several months, or even years, from the wrath of armed gangs. In these displacement sites, the level of unsanitary conditions and extreme poverty is very high.
- 101. Many hospital and healthcare center doors affected by insecurity remain closed. New doors have been closed during the analyzed period. Since the attempt to reopen the HUEH (State University Hospital) in December 2024, which resulted in the assassination of several individuals and the shooting of others, no effort has been made to regain control of the area where the largest hospital in the Western department is located. Thus, even though the doors of the Sainte-Catherine Labouré Hospital (CHOSCAL), located in Cité Soleil, were reopened on March 25, 2025, and a rehabilitation project for the Sainte-Marie Hospital in Cité Soleil

was launched on April 16, 2025, by the Economic and Social Assistance Fund (FAES), the situation regarding access to healthcare remains very concerning.

- 102. During the analyzed period, with armed attacks recorded, notably in Mirebalais and Saut-d'Eau, new police and penitentiary infrastructures were destroyed. New roads have fallen under the control of armed gangs, and the Haitian justice system is severely weakened.
- 103. On March 5, 2025, the CPT inaugurated the Antoine Simon International Airport in Les Cayes.
- 104. The promises of economic and tourism activity revival made by the transitional government have remained unfulfilled. In any case, the deterioration of the country's security situation, the closure of Toussaint Louverture International Airport for over five (5) months, and the daily increasing control of the movement of goods, services, and people on the national territory by armed bandits constitute significant obstacles to any revival of economic and tourism activities.
- 105. The bodies that should participate in institutional recovery and strengthening have not been established. Thus, contrary to Article 43 of the political agreement of April 3, 2024, no resources have been mobilized to address the population's needs in education, healthcare, and public hygiene.

In the majority of schools in the Western department, students have been replaced by victims and families of victims who fled insecurity.

Many hospitals and healthcare centers in the Western department have closed their doors during the analyzed period. The various alerts raised on this issue had no effect on the transitional authorities.

Police and penitentiary infrastructures were attacked and meticulously demolished by armed bandits who control the movement of goods, services, and people on the national territory.

The CPT inaugurated the Antoine Simon Airport in Les Cayes, which is only international in name. The Western department continues to be cut off from other cities in the country, and the transitional authorities are unable to adopt the minimum security measures required for the reopening of Toussaint Louverture International Airport.

Under these conditions, it is clear that no action has been taken to revive the country's economy. On the contrary, thousands of people have lost their jobs due to insecurity, and the country's economy is floundering.

C. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

106. On April 25, 2024, when the Provisional Presidential Council (CPT), composed of nine (9) members, took power, it committed to providing solutions to the multidimensional crisis faced by the Haitian population for several years. These solutions were to include restoring security, constitutional reform, and organizing elections. One year later, it is clear that the failure is total. None of the promises made in the political agreement for a peaceful and orderly transition have been fulfilled by the CPT.

107. In terms of political governance, the CPT members have not established the Government Action Control Body (OCAG) as provided in the political agreement of April 3, 2024. They are governing the country alone, awarding themselves outrageous expenses, living lavishly, and costing the state ninety-three million five hundred thousand (93,500,000) gourdes each month. They barter government positions, directorships, and departmental delegations; and they frequently travel abroad, organizing costly trips that contribute to the looting of state funds, such as five thousand (5,000) dollars for representation fees and one thousand (1,000) dollars per night for lodging.

108. Specifically, regarding the issue of travel, the disparities in their organization have drawn attention from the RNDDH. For example, for the trip of presidential adviser Lesly VOLTAIRE, then coordinator of the CPT, made from January 25 to 31, 2025, the delegation consisted of fewer than ten (10) people. The population was informed about the trip as well as the return of the presidential adviser. A conference was held during which the then-coordinator of the CPT presented his report to the public: the Pope, the President of France, French political leaders, and French civil society were met. In contrast, for the trip to the United States by presidential adviser Smith AUGUSTIN, from April 8 to 18, 2025, the delegation consisted of fifteen (15) people. The luxurious desires of the presidential adviser—manifested by expensive dinners and the lavish lifestyle he led while in the United States—cost the Haitian state at least one hundred thousand (100,000) dollars. And, as a result, the outgoing Secretary-General of the OAS and some members of the Haitian Diaspora were met.

109. The RNDDH finds it inconceivable that the Secretary-General of the Presidency could approve such waste of public funds and release enormous sums for trips often decided on a whim, without any invitations. Moreover, the approval of this trip by the other CPT members is even more questionable.

110. It is also worth mentioning that the two (2) CPT observers travel frequently at the state's expense. The only difference is that they often organize their travels quietly. However, society does not know what their work as observers entails that requires them to travel abroad on behalf of the state. Moreover, what exactly are they supposed to observe? And for whom?

111. Regarding the restoration of security, thirteen (13) massacres and armed attacks have been carried out in one year. These episodes of violence, along with other acts of violence against the lives and property of the population, have resulted in at least four thousand four hundred five (4,405) murders, including thirty-one (31) members of the PNH, eight (8) members of the FAD'H, two (2) agents of the MMAS; and three thousand eighty-four (3,084) cases of sexual and gender-based violence, including one thousand eight hundred thirty-seven (1,837) rapes and collective rapes.

112. The National Security Council (CNS), provided for in the political agreement of April 3, 2024, has not been established. On the other hand, a series of eclectic measures have been adopted by the CPT and its government: the decree declaring a state of security emergency first in certain communes of the Western department and then nationwide; the adoption of a war budget whose effects are not felt; the use of kamikaze drones against bandits with a mixed outcome of operations; the adoption of a resolution integrating the BSAP into the fight against insecurity, etc. These measures are merely cosmetic since the country's security situation has not improved. The RNDDH believes that if these measures had been adopted by a coordinated structure within the framework of a national security plan, they might have yielded results.

113. Regarding justice and the rule of law, twelve (12) of the thirteen (13) episodes of violence recorded under the CPT—except for the Wharf Jérémie massacre—did not lead the judicial

authorities to take public action against the terrorists. Even worse, the complaints filed by victims remain stagnant. The Justice, Truth, and Reparations Commission, provided for in the political agreement of April 3, 2024, was established, but composed of 43% of its members from influential figures of the PHTK, it has been denounced and has never been properly installed. The Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance and the Prosecutor's Office were relocated to Delmas 75 in a private residence, as judicial authorities were forced to flee before the fury of armed bandits. Two (2) specialized judicial units were recently created. Placed under the direction of the heads of jurisdiction of the Port-au-Prince Court of First Instance, hopes for results from these units remain very slim.

114. Furthermore, demonstrations denouncing the deterioration of the country's security situation have been severely repressed by the transitional authorities, causing human and material losses that could have been avoided. Attacks on the press and media have multiplied. At least six (6) radio and television stations have been vandalized and/or set on fire under the CPT. Control of another station was taken over by armed bandits. This repression of demonstrations and the ease with which attacks on the media have occurred are, at the very least, warning signs of a totalitarian state that threatens the respect and enjoyment of fundamental freedoms.

115. The handling of two (2) distinct cases—namely, the BNC corruption scandal that led to the indictment of three (3) presidential advisers who are protected by the CPT and the scandal related to the fraudulent awarding of the contract for the restoration of PNH agents—proves, if needed, that the transitional government does not intend to engage in the fight against corruption. Similarly, smuggling has never been a priority for this CPT, which has only adopted one decision to fight it: banning containers from the United States that transit through the Dominican Republic before entering Haiti. While this decision is important, it is still insufficient to combat the flow of arms and ammunition, as well as all other smuggling activities arriving on the national territory. The fight against corruption, financial crimes, and smuggling requires a comprehensive national security plan and the establishment of a system to control everything that enters through the country's various border, maritime, and air access points.

116. The constitutional reform, which was initiated without transparency and with arrogance by the CPT, risks not delivering the expected results. The population raised alarms about the process from the beginning. None of these alerts were taken into account by the CPT. Similarly, the electoral process launched with the establishment of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), under the conditions described above, will stall due to the irregularities that have tainted the process of selecting the representatives of the different sectors of the CEP, which, therefore, inspires no confidence.

117. No economic recovery plan exists. Social assistance programs raise questions about their effectiveness and their ability to reach those in need. The living conditions in the internally displaced persons' sites reflect the extreme poverty in which the Haitian population is mired. The movement of goods, services, and people on national territory is controlled and regulated

by armed bandits who install more and more toll booths every day. The already fragile health and education systems have been further weakened, especially with the closure and looting of additional school and healthcare infrastructures.

118. In conclusion, the CPT and its government have symbolized, for one year, a greedy and failing power, a ruined state. The country is being led in total absence of leadership, without direction, without vision, and without a societal project. Where the Haitian population had hoped for reforms, the CPT has offered a mafioso management of state affairs. In the face of the population's hope for the beginning of institutional recovery, the CPT has worsened the collapse of state institutions and, for the victims who demand protection and justice, the CPT has imposed silence, impunity, and predation. Above all, in none of its actions has the CPT thought to protect and defend the interests of the state.

119. Given this catastrophic assessment of the Provisional Presidential Council (CPT), the RNDDH recommends:

- The removal of the three (3) presidential advisers indicted for corruption, as well as the two (2) observers who are receiving public funds without any justification;
- Reducing the standard of living of all CPT members, eliminating the allowances they
 award to their spouses, and all other expenses they create to empty the state's coffers
 at their discretion;
- Cancelling all costly trips that, in fact, bring no benefit to the country;
- The establishment of the OCAG, the National Security Council, and all other bodies provided for in the political agreement of April 3, 2024;
- Cleaning up public finances and ensuring transparency in the use of state resources;
- Providing the necessary means and equipment to PNH agents and members of the Haitian Armed Forces (FAD'H) to track down and combat the Viv Ansanm terrorists;
- Restoring minimum security conditions to allow displaced populations to return home;
- The transparent adoption and implementation of social assistance programs to help the most vulnerable:
- The adoption of all measures aimed at transferring power on February 7, 2026, regardless of their achievements.